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Through trade policies such as antidumping remedies, the United
States government often protects domestic producers at the expense
of market competition. Yet a judicially created antitrust immunity,
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, obstructs the Federal Trade
Commission's antitrust investigations of these trade remedies. This
Article argues that judicial and administrative interventions are
needed to restore antitrust oversight when implementing trade
remedies. This Article does not propose a repealing of the current
antidumping statute, an act that would be politically infeasible in the
current protectionist atmosphere of Congress. Instead, it takes a
more modest yet realistic stance: antidumping remedies must be
sanitized by bringing certain abusive behavior in antidumping
proceedings-such as deliberate misrepresentations of facts and
data-under antitrust rules. In order to prevent domestic producers
from abusing antidumping remedies, courts should interpret the
sham exception broadly enough to effectively foreclose non-price
predation. At the same time, the Federal Trade Commission, under
its vested antitrust authority, should strengthen its surveillance and
enforcement activities to guard against the abuse of trade remedies.
In the long-term, these targeted judicial and administrative
interventions will lead the public and legislators alike to rethink the
antidumping statute itself.
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"The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in
the value of competition. 1
INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s, ferrosilicon producers in the United States,
who had formed a price-fixing cartel faced an obstacle when Brazilian
producers, began exporting the metal cheaply.2 The U.S. cartel
members soon asked Brazilian exporters to join their cartel under the
threat of an antidumping petition in which the former would argue
that the latter had unfairly dumped their ferrosilicon in the U.S.
market.' When Brazilian producers rejected the offer, the U.S.
producers successfully executed their threat.4  Upon the U.S.
producers' petition, the U.S. government imposed antidumping duties
on Brazilian ferrosilicon, effectively excluding all Brazilian
ferrosilicon producers from the U.S. market.5 This antidumping
remedy was revoked only after a whistleblower later divulged the
cartel's existence.6  This case aptly illustrates how effortlessly
domestic producers may abuse trade remedies for anticompetitive
purposes.
Since the birth of the Union, competition has served as the
ideological foundation of this nation's economic governance. Both
the people and the government of the United States believe that "the
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces" will bring them
prosperity and progress.7 Based on this belief, the United States
1. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (quoting
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951)).
2. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Antidumping Law as a Means of Facilitating
Cartelization, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 725, 726-28 (2000).
3. See id. at 727-28.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 728.
7. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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enacted the Sherman Act,' established the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"),9 split Standard Oil ° and AT&T," and, more
recently, challenged Microsoft's abusive monopoly in the personal
computer operating system market. 2
Nonetheless, international trade has seldom been the subject of
antitrust law. While internal competition is highly protected in the
domestic market, external competition from foreign producers has
been largely neglected and, thus, has avoided antitrust scrutiny. In
fact, the government, through its trade policies, often hampers foreign
competition, protecting domestic producers at the expense of all the
benefits that foreign competition might bring to the economy. 3 For
example, the antidumping statute enables the government to impose
additional tariffs on foreign imports, neutralizing the imports' price
competitiveness under the euphemistic rhetoric of remedying unfair
trade.14  In addition to its de facto price-fixing effect, 5  the
antidumping regime restrains trade through a strategy labeled "non-
price predation," in which domestic producers file spurious
8. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006). The Sherman Antitrust Act was
originally enacted on July 2, 1890. Id.
9. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006). The Federal Trade
Commission Act was originally enacted on September 26, 1914. Id.
10. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 78-82 (1911) (affirming the
lower court's dissolution of Standard Oil's ownership of stock, which constituted an
attempt to create a monopoly).
11. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 223 (D.D.C. 1982)
(severing "local Operating Companies from the Bell System").
12. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
13. See Einar Hope, Introduction to COMPETITION AND TRADE POLICIES:
COHERENCE OR CONFLICT 1, 3 (Einar Hope & Per Maeleng eds., 1998) (observing that a
captured, protectionist policy undermines competition policy and, hence, market
inefficiency as well as deteriorated consumers' welfare).
14. See Bernard M. Hoekman & Michael P. Leidy, Antidumping and Market
Disruption: The Incentive Effects of Antidumping Laws, in THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM: ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 155, 164 (Robert M. Stern
ed., 1993) [hereinafter THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM] (viewing the fair trade
rationale as "red herring"); see also JAMES BOVARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD 139, 158-
60 (1991) (noting that the definition of fair trade differs depending on whether it is being
applied to Americans or foreigners).
15. The fact that domestic prices preserved by antidumping petitions are not identical
does not necessarily indicate the absence of price fixing. In other words, domestic
producers can still demonstrate the semblance of competition among themselves by
maintaining multiple prices while they effectively drive out foreign rivals charging low
prices. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST RESOURCES MANUAL (Oct. 1997),
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title7/ant00008.htm; see also
BOVARD, supra note 14, at 158 (noting that antidumping law indirectly controls prices of
imported goods).
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antidumping petitions to terrorize foreign rivals.16 Nearly half of all
antidumping petitions turn out to be without merit. 7
Confronted by the disturbing anticompetitive effects of these
trade remedies, one might suggest that the FTC should exercise its
latent jurisdiction over international trade, thereby subjecting trade
remedies to antitrust scrutiny. Following this approach, the FTC
would protect competition itself, not competitors. 18  However, the
FTC's antitrust regulation of trade remedies is obstructed by a
judicially-created antitrust immunity: the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. 9 A legal reincarnation of political pluralism crafted by the
Warren Court,2" this doctrine exempts private parties from antitrust
scrutiny when they lobby the government for certain benefits, even if
the lobbying inhibits competition.2" Thus, the doctrine effectively
immunizes antidumping petitioners from any antitrust investigations
of their trade-restraining behaviors. The doctrine has a limitation-
the "sham exception,"-which disapplies the doctrine in the context
of sham petitions that have the sole purpose of harassing rivals.
Nevertheless, courts have interpreted the exception so narrowly as to
render it ineffective in antidumping cases.22
Given the notoriously loose standards for determining dumping
and injury3-the central issues of antidumping remedies-this gap in
16. See generally Pierre F. de Ravel d'Esclapon, Non-Price Predation and the
Improper Use of U.S. Unfair Trade Laws, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 543, 547-49 (1987) (citing
the harsh effects of antidumping measures on foreign rivals and describing efforts to avoid
"sham" petitions, filed for the purpose of harassing foreign trading rivals).
17. Elizabeth L. Gunn, Eliminating the Protectionist Free Ride: The Need for Cost
Redistribution in Antidumping Cases, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 165, 177 (2005).
18. A. Paul Victor, Task Force Report on the Interface Between International Trade
Law and Policy and Competition Law and Policy: Introduction, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 463,
464 (1987).
19. See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
140-44 (1965); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1960).
For a case employing the doctrine, see City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc.,
499 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1990) (holding that federal antitrust laws do not regulate the
conduct of private individuals in seeking anticompetitive action from the government,
because, while appropriate in a business context, it is not appropriate in the political
arena).
20. See Gary Minda, Antitrust at Century's End, 48 SMU L. REV. 1749, 1765 n.81
(1995).
21. See United Mine Workers, 381 U.S. at 670 (holding that the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine protects joint efforts to influence public officials from the Sherman Act).
22. See Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. at 380 (holding that the sham exception only
applies to the process and not the outcome); see also de Ravel d'Esclapon, supra note 16,
at 547-48 (describing the effects a petition has on trade competition and articulating the
need for accurate petitions to avoid shams).
23. See generally Pierce, supra note 2, at 729 (describing the ease with which domestic
business can assert antidumping claims).
2009]
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enforcement of antitrust rules to trade remedies is highly troubling.
Currently, petitioners may manipulate antidumping proceedings by
inflating, exaggerating, and even misrepresenting facts and data so as
to prevail in dumping and injury determinations.24 Because there is
no antitrust enforcement as a backstop to the illegitimate trade
remedies created by these potential misrepresentations, restraints on
competition pass into the marketplace. If left unchecked, the
frequent abuse of trade remedies and corresponding stifling of
market competition will result in tremendous damage to the
economy.
Against this backdrop, this Article argues that the government,
via both judicial and administrative intervention, must implement
effective antitrust oversight of abusive trade remedies. It does not
propose repealing the current antidumping statute; such a drastic
measure would be politically infeasible in the current protectionist
atmosphere of Congress.2" Instead, this Article takes a more modest,
yet realistic, stance: antidumping remedies must be sanitized by
holding abusive behaviors in antidumping proceedings-such as
deliberate misrepresentations of facts and data-accountable under
antitrust law.26 In order to prevent domestic producers from abusing
antidumping remedies, courts should interpret the sham exception
broadly enough to effectively foreclose non-price predation. Courts
can achieve this goal by focusing on antidumping petitioners'
fraudulent, unethical, or tortious use of misstatements or
misrepresentations in antidumping proceedings. At the same time,
the FTC, under its vested antitrust authority, should strengthen its
surveillance and enforcement activities to guard against the abuse of
trade remedies by domestic producers. In the long-term, these
targeted judicial and administrative interventions will lead both the
public and legislators to rethink the antidumping statute itself.
This thesis of correcting trade remedies via enhanced antitrust
disciplines provided by the courts and the FTC is presented in four
24. See BOVARD, supra note 14, at 136, 139 (noting that "American companies have
not been penalized for submitting knowingly false information" in antidumping petitions).
25. See RAINER M. BIERWAGEN, GATT ARTICLE VI AND THE PROTECTIONIST
BIAS IN ANTIDUMPING LAWS 157 (1990).
26. The proposal in this Article is basically in sync with the beliefs of other scholars
who argue for antitrust checks against trade policies. See, e.g., Hoekman & Leidy, supra
note 14, at 170 (emphasizing cooperation between domestic antitrust agencies and trade
authorities); Konstantinos Adamantopoulos & Diego de Notaris, The Future of the WTO
and the Reform of the Anti-dumping Agreement: A Legal Perspective, 24 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 30, 55 (2000) (proposing involvement by a domestic antitrust agency in injury
determinations to ensure "competition principles").
[Vol. 87
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parts. Part I exposes the flawed rhetoric of fair trade behind the
antidumping regime. This Part illustrates that antidumping remedies
lack economic sense, because they neglect or misinterpret firms' cost
structure. Part I will also show that antidumping remedies lack legal
sense because their ultimate normativity hinges not purely on the
validity of an underlying transaction (dumping), but cumulatively on
their commercial effect (injuries). Part I concludes with an analysis of
the antidumping remedies' protectionist modus operandi, which
evinces elusive concepts of prices and injuries, as well as procedural
injustice.
Absent a genuine fair trade justification, current antidumping
measures remedy nothing while creating distortions in market
economies. Part II first defines antidumping remedies as a
Madisonian failure because they only serve the special interests of a
handful of domestic producers; specifically, the remedies aid
economic factions at the expense of the entire economy. Part II then
explains a more serious antitrust failure in which domestic producers
harass and exclude foreign rivals through non-price predation. This
process of harassment and intimidation may eventually lead to
cartelization of an industry.
Next, Part III suggests a course of action to remedy the flaws of
trade remedies. Radical measures, such as repealing the antidumping
statute, are politically infeasible. Therefore, this Part suggests that
the FTC should expand its statutory authority more vigorously into
the area of international trade. At the same time, however, this Part
highlights how the Noerr-Pennington doctrine may potentially
obstruct the FTC's oversight of antidumping remedies.
Finally, Part IV argues that the courts should adopt a broader
interpretation of the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine to facilitate the application of antitrust rules to trade
remedies. When determining whether a petition is a sham, courts
currently consider whether the claim is baseless." However, Part IV
argues that courts should adopt a more unequivocal test that would
better detect fraud and other unethical aims of petitioners, such as
harassing and excluding rivals. This Part also suggests that the FTC
should target certain abusive behaviors by antidumping petitioners,
such as deliberate misrepresentations and repetitive petitioning,
because the current Noerr-Pennington jurisprudence reserves room
for antitrust liability for these unethical behaviors. The FTC can also
monitor petitioners' behaviors by requiring them to register before
27. See infra Part III.C.2.
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they file antidumping complaints, in tandem with a similar
requirement under the Webb-Pomerene Act.28 Part IV concludes by
raising the possibility of disapplying the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to
private rights of action based on abusive behavior that may constitute
a tortious interference with business.
In sum, this Article concludes that a political marketplace ideal
should not unduly absolve patent antitrust violations in apolitical
areas, such as antidumping proceedings.
I. DEMYSTIFYING TRADE REMEDIES: A FAIR TRADE RHETORIC
WITH PROTECTIONIST SUBSTANCES
A. Outlining the U.S. Antidumping Regime
1. Origin and Evolution
The historical development of the antidumping regime in the
United States offers a powerful elucidation of its protectionist nature.
The genesis of U.S antidumping regulation derives from antitrust
concerns rather than from the protection of domestic industries.
Influenced by the antitrust sentiments in the late nineteenth century,
which led to the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, the first U.S.
antidumping statute, the Antidumping Act of 1916, required the
existence of predatory intent to punish foreign dumping and also
imposed criminal liability for violations.2 9
The Antidumping Act of 1921 superseded the 1916 Act and
provided a prototype for the current antidumping statute.30 To
protect infant U.S. industries from "powerful European cartels,"'" the
1921 Act only required that foreign dumping allegedly cause
"injuries" to domestic industries without a separate requirement of
28. See Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (2006) (requiring export businesses
to register with the FTC and allowing the FIC to summon businesses if there is reasonable
belief of a trade restraint).
29. See J. Michael Finger, The Origins and Evolution of Antidumping Regulation 12-
13 (Trade Policy Div., Country Econ. Dep't, The World Bank, Working Paper Series No.
783, 1991) (noting the Act's requirement of "an intent to injure, destroy, or prevent the
establishment of an industry in the United States or to restrain competition"); Douglas A.
Irwin, The Rise of U.S. Antidumping Activity in Historical Perspective, 28 WORLD ECON.
651, 652-53 (2005).
30. See Finger, supra note 29, at 15.
31. Roy L. Prosterman, Withholding of Appraisement Under the United States
Antidumping Act: Protectionism or Unfair-Competition Law?, 41 WASH. L. REV. 315, 316
(1966) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 87
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predatory intent.32 The only remedy provided for by this new law was
the imposition of duties equivalent to the magnitude of dumping on
violators.33 It was this softened standard under the 1921 Act that
ushered in the administrative flexibility that enabled the government
to manage trade policies in the interests of domestic industries and in
tune with protectionist political climates.34 The 1921 Act also
provided a basis for Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT"), which authorizes domestic antidumping
measures.
3 5
Nonetheless, protectionist enlistment of antidumping measures
did not fully materialize until the 1970s.36 Tariff barriers provided
effective import relief in the 1950s and 1960s, before the average
tariffs began to significantly fall under the Kennedy Round of trade
talks in the late 1960s.37 Despite the relatively steady number of
antidumping cases filed in the 1950s and 1960s, actual determinations
of injuries were rare during this period.38 This phenomenon may be
explained by the lingering effects of the 1916 Act, which required the
existence of predatory intent."9 Although the text of the 1921 Act did
not require the existence of predatory intent, the legislative intent of
the 1921 Act was still to address "commercial warfare." For example,
the Act sought to redress potentially aggressive or predatory
exporting by foreign producers.4" The goal of the 1921 Act was to
prevent a situation where, "while temporarily cheaper prices are
had[,] our industries are destroyed[,] after which we more than repay
in the exaction of higher prices."41  This antitrust relic of the
antidumping statute maintained, at least on a de facto basis, the
predatory intent requirement. Until the 1960s, the Tariff Commission
(the predecessor of the International Trade Commission ("ITC"))
often based its injury determination on the existence of predatory
32. See Finger, supra note 29, at 19.
33. See id. at 15.
34. Id. at 21 (noting that the shift from a legal standard to an administrative one
broadened the application of antidumping laws).
35. Id. at 15 (finding that the current antidumping law traces back to the Antidumping
Act of 1921).
36. See generally id. at 29-30 (recounting how actions against below-cost imports were
federally approved).
37. Id. at 25-26.
38. Irwin, supra note 29, at 9.
39. See Finger, supra note 29, at 12-13.
40. Antidumping Act, ch. 14, § 201(a), 42 Stat. 11 (192t).
41. H.R. Rep. No. 67-1, at 23-24 (1921).
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intent.42 The absence of predatory intent frequently led the Tariff
Commission to a negative finding of injury.43
Yet, the 1921 Act began to be stretched to serve a protectionist
purpose as the level of import penetration in the U.S. market (the
import/GDP rate) increased from three percent in the 1950s and
1960s to eight percent in the 1980s.44 "New protectionism, 4 5 or
"administered protection,"46 with a litany of non-tariff barriers
("NTBs"), such as antidumping measures, emerged in the 1970s and
1980s as traditional protectionist devices (tariffs) waned through
trade rounds.47 In 1980, Congress transferred the task of dumping
determinations from the Department of Treasury to the Department
of Commerce ("DOC").48 The Department of Treasury seldom
delivered affirmative findings of injury. Frustrated by the
Department of Treasury's reluctance to use the antidumping statute
in a protectionist manner, Congress took away the Treasury
Department's authority over antidumping proceedings and accorded
it to the DOC whose major constituency is domestic producers.49
Moreover, in the 1970s, Congress expanded the scope of
antidumping investigations from conventional price discrimination to
include sales below cost. U.S. domestic firms often price their
products below full cost to be more competitive. ° Yet, domestic
producers pressured the government to revise an administrative
interpretation to exclude the same kind of transaction (sales below
cost) by foreign producers from the calculation of normal value on
the grounds that these sales were not made "in the ordinary course of
trade."'5' This exclusion naturally led to a higher probability of
finding positive dumping margins. Originally, the Treasury
Department wished to limit use of this expansive definition of
42. See, e.g., Bicycles from Czechoslovakia, 25 Fed. Reg. 9782 (1960); Carbon Steel
Bars & Shapes from Can., 29 Fed. Reg. 12,599 (1964).
43. See, e.g., Portland Cement from Dom. Rep., 27 Fed. Reg. 3872 (1962); Portland
Cement from Can., 25 Fed. Reg. 2191 (1960); Rayon Staple Fiber from Fr., 24 Fed. Reg.
10,092 (1959).
44. Irwin, supra note 29, at 10.
45. See Dominick Salvatore, Import Penetration, Exchange Rates, and Protectionism
in the United States, 8 J. POL'Y MODELING 125, 125 (1987).
46. ANNE 0. KRUEGER, AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: A TRAGEDY IN THE MAKING
33-35 (1995).
47. DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND
CULTURE 187 (1999).
48. KRUEGER, supra note 46, at 36-37.
49. Irwin, supra note 29, at 655-56.
50. See KRUEGER, supra note 46, at 6.
51. Finger, supra note 29, at 29 (internal quotation omitted).
[Vol. 87
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dumping under its reserved discretion. 2 However, Congress, led by
the powerful Senator Russell Long, then chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, codified the expansive definition in the 1974
Trade Act.53 The protectionist impact of this change can be attested
to by the fact that more than half of the U.S. antidumping cases that
followed concerned sales below cost.
54
In sum, as J. Michael Finger trenchantly observed, the very
history of antidumping reveals that the major purpose of the
antidumping statute is sheer protectionism, although this purpose is
camouflaged by a "grand public relations program., 5 5 Finger noted
that, "[a]dding this or that technical amendment-tailor-made to fit
the situation of a particular and powerful constituent-soon became
another vehicle for constituent service, the lifeblood of congressional
politics."56
2. The Current System
The current U.S. antidumping statute57 is designed to protect
domestic producers from imports offered for sale at "less than fair
value," a practice known as "dumping." The antidumping statute
allows domestic producers to petition relevant government agencies
to investigate alleged dumping practices by foreign producers known
as "dumpers. '58  If these agencies determine that dumping is
occurring, and that it threatens or actually inflicts material injury59 to
the petitioner, the government will execute a remedial action by
imposing antidumping duties on the foreign producer's imports in
accordance with the magnitude of dumping that has occurred.6°
In most cases, except for a self-initiation by the DOC,61
individual producers file an antidumping complaint on behalf of a
specific industry62 that, as a whole, produces a specific product that is
52. Id. at 30.
53. See generally id. at 30 (noting that Senator Long amended the 1974 trade bill to
"require that sales below cost be considered dumping").
54. Id. at 33.
55. Id. at 42.
56. Id. at 27.
57. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673h, 1675-1675a, 1677-1677n (2006).
58. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1).
59. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673(2)(A), 1677(7)(A).
60. 19 US.C. § 1673.
61. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a)(1) (authorizing the DOC to self-initiate investigations).
62. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(C)-(F) (defining the term "interested parties" as, among
others, those manufacturing a "domestic like product"); 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A)-(B)
(defining the terms "industry" and "related parties").
2009]
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like, or competitive with, an alleged dumped product.63 Two different
government agencies-the International Trade Administration
("ITA"), which is under the DOC, and the ITC-are involved in the
investigative process.' Upon the initiation of an investigation, the
ITC preliminarily decides whether the alleged dumped import has
caused material injury or a threat of injury to the petitioner.65 If the
ITC determines there is a threat of or actual material injury, the ITA
in turn decides on a preliminary basis whether there is dumping-a
sale in the U.S. at less than fair value.66
The ITA also calculates the dumping margin, which determines
the amount of antidumping duties.67 The dumping margin is the
difference between an imported good's home market price (normal
value)6" and its price in the U.S. market (export price).69 When the
imported product is not consumed in the exporting country's home
market, the ITA will substitute the product's price in a third market
in which it is sold to calculate normal value.70 If the ITA considers
home market prices unreliable,7' the ITA will "construct" normal
values by adding production costs and profits of its own reckoning.72
In calculating export price, the ITA makes certain adjustments to
ensure that the export price is "ex factory," meaning it does not
include post-factory expenses, such as transportation costs. 73  The
ITA's preliminary determination on dumping and dumping margins is
followed by a final determination.74  If, after the ITA's final
determination, the ITC also issues a final determination finding a
63. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (defining the term "domestic like product").
64. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (referring to the "administrative authority" and the
"commission" as determining facts about dumping); 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1) (defining the
"administering authority" as the Secretary of Commerce); 19 U.S.C. § 1677(2) (defining
the "commission" as the International Trade Commission).
65. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a).
66. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b).
67. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A) (defining and explaining the calculation of the term
"dumping margins"); 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(B) (explaining the calculation of the weighted
average dumping margin).
68. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1) (explaining the calculation of "normal value").
69. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a) (defining "export price");
19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c) (explaining the calculation of export price).
70. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(C) (allowing the ITA to use a third market to determine
normal value); 19 C.F.R. § 351.404 (2008) (deciding which third market to use).
71. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (finding unreliability in below cost sales); 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(c) (finding unreliability in nonmarket economies).
72. Id. Constructive normal value calculations are carried out by the ITA, taking into
account general factors set forth in the statute. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.405.
73. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A) (concerning costs that are deducted to arrive at export
price); 19 C.F.R. § 351.402.
74. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a).
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material injury or a threat thereof,75 the Customs Office will collect
antidumping duties (tariffs) equivalent to the ITA's final dumping
76margin.
Antidumping orders remain in effect unless they are revoked
pursuant to a review of the order.77 A foreign producer may request a
review to revoke a final determination resulting in an antidumping
order by the ITA and ITC no earlier than two years after the issuance
of the order, absent a showing of good cause." However, an
interested party, 9 including foreign and domestic producers, may
request that the ITA conduct an annual administrative review to
recalculate the exact amount of antidumping duties.8 " Five years after
an antidumping order is issued, the ITA and the ITC will initiate a
mandatory review of the order, often called a "sunset review."'" In
the meantime, foreign producers may challenge both the ITC's and
the ITA's final determinations before the Court of International
Trade and subsequently appeal to the Federal Circuit and eventually
to the Supreme Court.82 However, the U.S. courts afford both the
ITC and the ITA determinations great deference under the Chevron
doctrine.83
75. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b).
76. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a).
77. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d) (explaining the process for revocation of an antidumping
order subject to a review based on changed circumstances under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b), a
review of the amount of duties under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a), or a five year "sunset review"
under 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)).
78. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)(4).
79. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (defining an "interested party").
80. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a).
81. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (obligating the ITA and the ITC to review an antidumping
order five years after issuance).
82. The Court of International Trade has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c),
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5). The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article III,
Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution and reviews cases by granting a writ of
certiorari.
83. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Ress. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984). For an example of Chevron deference applied in the antidumping context, see
Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. Int'l Union of Elec., Elec., Tech., Salaried & Mach. Workers, 6 F.3d
1511, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993) appeal after remand at 152 F.3d 1511, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see
also Smith-Corona v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1022 (1984) (according "tremendous deference to the expertise of the Secretary of
Commerce in administering the antidumping law").
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B. Analyzing the Fallacy of the Unfair Trade Rationale
1. An Economic Analysis
Advocates for the antidumping regime, including the U.S.
government, attempt to cloak its protectionist nature in unfair trade
mantra." The rationale of antidumping remedies is based on a notion
of "fairness," which proponents believe is achieved through a "level
playing field" of their own reckoning." In other words, these
remedies are imposed on the assumption that foreign producers have
engaged in certain unfair practices without which they could not have
produced such cheap products. It is argued, therefore, that
antidumping remedies should neutralize this unfair price advantage
by imposing duties at the border.86 The corollary of this position is
that producers who compete in the market, global or local, should be
given identical conditions for production, including socioeconomic
arrangements influenced by labor-management and government-
business relations. In this regard, the U.S. government contends that
[a] government's industrial policies or key aspects of the
economic system supported by government inaction can enable
injurious dumping to take place. Although these policies take
on many different forms, they can provide similar artificial
advantages to producers. For instance, these policies may allow
producers to earn high profits in a home "sanctuary market,"
which may in turn allow them to sell abroad at an artificially
low price. Such practices can result in injury in the importing
country since domestic firms may not be able to match the
artificially low prices from producers in the sanctuary market.87
Although this ostensibly clear-cut argument may appeal to
ordinary people in its most abstract terms, it is seriously flawed. First,
one must not forget that the benefit of trade stems from the fact that
84. BOVARD, supra note 14, at 158-60.
85. See BRINK LINDSEY & DANIEL J. IKENSON, ANTIDUMPING EXPOSED: THE
DEVILISH DETAILS OF UNFAIR TRADE LAW xi (2003).
86. Id. at vii-viii.
87. Communication from the United States, Basic Concepts and Principles of the
Trade Remedy Rules, TN/RL/W/27, T 13 (Oct. 22, 2002); see also Jeffrey E. Garten, Is
America Abandoning Multilateral Trade?, FOREIGN AFF. Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 50, 57 ("Our
standards of openness are higher than others' because our market is more open. We want
foreign countries to come up to our level, not to settle for the lowest common
denominator."). The DOC's website instructs how to file antidumping claims against
imports in the name of "Ensuring a Level Playing Field." Department of Commerce
Home Page, Ensuring a Level Playing Field, http://www.commerce.gov/field.html (last
visited Jan. 3, 2009).
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trading partners are different, not identical, in many ways, 8 such as
their levels of development and natural endowment. These
differences bring price competitiveness to certain producers, because
they are capable of producing their products more cheaply than their
rivals.89  These superior conditions, collectively labeled as
"comparative advantage," are the very engine of trade.90 Therefore,
these conditions must not be leveled and these cheap prices must not
be neutralized or countervailed if we truly mean to engage in trade.
9
In a broader sense, market economy forces dictate that domestic
industries losing their competitive edges should give their places in
the market to more efficient and innovative competitors, be they
foreign or domestic.92 This is a fundamental rule of market economy
and should not be breached. And, perhaps more importantly, it is
fair. According to this rule, countless firms disappear and at the same
time newly emerge in this country.93 Consumers and the U.S.
economy benefit from this seemingly simple, yet powerful, process.
In addition, the "sanctuary market" argument employed by the
U.S. government is nothing but a smokescreen hiding protectionism.
The antidumping advocates believe that dumpers can set lower prices
in the exporting market than they do in the domestic market only
because they can manipulatively assign lower costs to export prices
than to domestic prices.94 Advocates contend that this manipulative
allocation of cost is possible thanks to dumpers' monopoly profits in
the sanctuary (home) market. Therefore, such cost structure is an
outcome of "subsidization," which is unjustified and thus should be
counteracted by imposing antidumping duties.95 However, this is a
"fallacy of cost-plus pricing," as John Barcel6 III aptly posited. If one
duly takes into account the "demand" side in this picture, he or she
will soon realize that this cost allocation is purely a legitimate
88. See generally Paul R. Krugman, What Do Undergrads Need to Know About
Trade?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 23 (1993) (discussing economic misconceptions, including the
belief that countries compete "in the same way companies in the same business are in
competition").
89. Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 14, at 164.
90. See WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 13 (2007), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw-Chapl-e.pdf.
91. See Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 14, at 164.
92. See, e.g., Richard Squire, Antitrust and the Supremacy Clause, 59 STAN. L. REV.
77, 112 (2006) ("[I]n an open market, competition will cause firms to enter and exit until
the cost of producing a given amount of output is optimized.").
93. Id.
94. John J. Barcel6 III, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade-The United States
and the International Dumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 491,503-06 (1972).
95. Id.
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business practice.96 In other words, to maximize his or her profits, an
exporter tends to charge a lower price in the more elastic foreign
market and a higher price in the less elastic home market.9 7
Close scrutiny of a foreign producers' cost structure reveals that
dumping, whether by price discrimination or sales below cost, is in
fact normal business behavior in the absence of any predatory
intent.98 In the case of price discrimination, if extra transaction costs
accompanied by foreign sales are not too high, the actual sale price in
the foreign market may be lower than in the home market.99 Also,
firms often respond to market depression or pursue sale
maximization despite short-term loss of profits through sales below
average or marginal cost.1" As for a foreign producer's potential
predatory intent to drive out domestic rivals by underselling them, it
is often inconceivable, perhaps laughable, considering that a foreign
product's share of the importing market is often insignificant."1 Even
in the domestic setting, "predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried,
and even more rarely successful."' 2  In conclusion, the economic
rationale for antidumping remedies rings false, while the economic
harms of protectionism, such as inefficiency and costs to consumers,
rings clear.13
In fact, those transactions described as dumping occur in the
domestic arena all the time.104 For instance, airplane companies
routinely engage in price differentiation through various discounts
over the same quality of seats. A shirt's price can vary depending on
points of sale-for example, from an outlet store to a department
store. Many stores undersell their rivals even below the cost level to
secure certain market share. However, these practices are all deemed
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1,
14 (1995) ("As long as the exporter's marginal revenue from sales in the importing country
exceeds its marginal cost of production, the exporter is behaving in an economically
rational fashion." (emphasis added)); see also William J. Davey, Antidumping Laws in the
GATT and the EC, in ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
295, 296 (John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989).
99. Alan V. Deardorff, Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Law, in THE
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 14, at 135, 139.
100. Id. at 144-48.
101. Patrick Messerlin, The EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economic
Appraisal, 1980-85, 125 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV 563-87 (1989); Pierce, supra
note 2, at 733 (observing that, in most successful antidumping cases, "none of the foreign
suppliers accounts for a dominant share of the market").
102. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986).
103. Deardorff, supra note 99, at 154.
104. Pierce, supra note 2, at 731.
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legitimate as a profit-maximization strategy in the United States in
the absence of "predatory intention," as stipulated by domestic
statutes such as the Robinson-Patman Act. l"5 In other words,
domestic dumping practices are perfectly legal unless dumpers intend
to eventually drive out their rivals. Yet, a double standard is evident
in cases where those rivals are foreign. Imported products that enjoy
price competitiveness-namely, cheap goods-are often accused of
being "dumped." 106
In sum, without economic support for the alleged "unfair trade"
rationale, the motivation for antidumping measures is reserved only
to protectionism. The unfair trade mantra, in fact, comes from those
interest groups seeking protection from foreign rivals. 107 As Kenneth
Dam observed over three decades ago, "the concern with dumping is
... a concern with the protection of domestic industry from
international competition. ' 18 More often than not, such protectionist
rationale is associated with a deprecatory image that the term
"dump" carries with it, and even serves as xenophobic propaganda.
10 9
By framing cheap imports as fruits of illicit activities through complex
arbitrary regulations, antidumping measures give legal cover to the
institutionalization of protectionism. 10 Likewise, a bellicose myopia
of "us versus them," as seen in the Cold War mentality, blinds both
policy-makers and the public from the important benefits of trade,
including consumer welfare and efficient allocation of resources
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 13a (2006) (prohibiting underselling "for the purpose of destroying
competition, or eliminating a competitor").
106. See, e.g., Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Tariff on China Unlikely to Impact Cheap
Imports, FOxNEWS.COM, June 30, 2005, http://www.foxnews.comlstory/0,2933,161160,00.
html.
107. Diane P. Wood, "Unfair" Trade Injury. A Competition-Based Approach, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1171 (1989); see also CANDIDO TOMAS GARCIA MOLYNEUX,
DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE UNFAIR TRADE
INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 39-40 (2001)
(observing that U.S. trade policies based on fairness in fact impose "standards embedding
implicit parochial views on the behavior of political institutions and market actors").
108. KENNETH DAM, THE GATF: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 168 (1970).
109. BOVARD, supra note 14, at 35; see also Frederick Davis, The Regulation and
Control of Foreign Trade, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1439 (1966) (observing that the
antidumping remedy is based on the "tortious or quasi-criminal quality" of dumping and
thus insinuates the "official moral sense" in its allegation); Michael S. Knoll, Dump Our
Anti-Dumping Law, 1991 CATO INST. FOREIGN POL'Y BRIEFING No. 11 (noting that
domestic interests are "using the rhetorical concept of dumping as the basis for their moral
and emotional appeal to justify ... the existing anti-dumping law"); Pierce, supra note 2, at
735 (noting that "[the word 'dumping'] conjures up an image of an evil foreign corporation
that is using the United States as a toxic waste dump").
110. LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 85, at ix.
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rendered by cheap imports."' Unsurprisingly, most mainstream
economists and policymakers, including former Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Alan Greenspan, recognize in unison that
antidumping measures are nothing but protectionism." 2  Alan
Deardorff also observes that, ever since the classical study by Jacob
Viner, economists have viewed dumping as harmless and without
predatory, monopolistic intent." 3
2. A Legal Analysis
Admittedly, low-priced foreign products are not and should not
always be immune from government regulations or countermeasures.
If, according to international trade law or, sometimes, local statutes of
importing countries, an underlying production process at home
involves any illicit or illegitimate activities, imports may be halted. If
an import's low prices are attributable to government subsidies, they
may be banned or subjected to countervailing duties."4 Likewise, if
low prices are attributable to prison labor or piracy, the imports may
be prohibited.'15 If low prices are the result of predation, and are
deliberately aimed at driving out rivals in a given market to enjoy a
monopolistic position afterward, domestic antitrust statutes may
provide punitive measures." 6 If low prices on imports are otherwise
legal, but nevertheless cause serious injury to domestic industries, an
importing country's government may still rely on safeguard measures
under certain conditions." 7
However, the above-mentioned scenarios, apart from safeguards,
all relate to the "illegality" of underlying production activities, not the
111. Mark Philip Bradley, Narrow Idealism, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 2004, § 2, at 1.
112. Alan Greenspan, testifying before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance on July
4, 2001, stated "[tihese forms of protection have often been imposed under the label of
promoting 'fair trade,' but oftentimes they are just simple guises for inhibiting
competition." International Trade and the American Economy: Hearing on International
Trade and the American Economy Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 107th Cong. 44 (2001)
(prepared statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of Fed. Reserve).
113. Deardorff, supra note 99, at 149-51; JACOB VINER, STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 145-47 (1965). This predatory dumping is a kind of
"intermittent" dumping that Jacob Viner viewed as harmful because it lasts long enough
to injure other producers (unlike "sporadic" dumping) yet not long enough for consumers'
welfare to materialize (unlike "continuous" dumping). Barcel6, supra note 94, at 508-09.
114. LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 85, at 42-43
115. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX(d)-(e), Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (allowing general exceptions for products of prison labor and
piracy, respectively).
116. See supra notes 5, 85-86 and accompanying text.
117. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XIX(1)(b), Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (allowing emergency action on imports of particular products).
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commercial impact that imports exert on rival domestic producers. If
these underlying production activities are illegal in the importing
country, for example, production by prison labor, the importation of
such products can be banned regardless of their injurious effect to
rival domestic industries. It is an established principle that any
violation of international trade rules ipso facto nullifies or impairs the
benefits of other trading partners.11 In other words, complaining
parties need not demonstrate injuries that violations under
international trade law may have caused them or their domestic
industries.119 As a corollary, defending parties cannot escape their
legal responsibilities from those violations, even if they generate no
damages to other trading partners. However, very few allegations of
unfair or illegal practices leading to dumping have ever been brought
before the WTO dispute settlement mechanism or under the U.S.
domestic trade statutes, such as section 301.120 These underlying
practices are seldom mentioned even in the United States Trade
Representative's ("USTR") annual report on foreign trade barriers,
the National Trade Estimates ("NTE").
121
In stark contrast, antidumping laws predicate their foundation on
the very existence of "injuries." If certain imports, no matter how
unfair they may be, do not cause injury or the threat of injury to
domestic rivals, the petition fails. In other words, the existence of
injuries is a litmus test for affording domestic producers protection.
Only after a preliminary injury determination does the DOC begin
examining whether dumping has really occurred and, if so, to what
extent (the dumping margin). 22  In nearly all cases, domestic
industries initiate antidumping investigations with petitions that
allege injury by unfair foreign imports.123
The protectionist attributes of antidumping laws can also be
discovered in the very structure of these processes, which tend to
burden and disadvantage the respondents. The ITC's affirmative
preliminary injury determination triggers an issuance of long and
complicated DOC questionnaires to the mandatory respondents, who
are major foreign producers and, at the same time, market
118. See Tarcisio Gazzini, The Legal Nature of WTO Obligations and the Consequences
of their Violations, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 723, 731-32 (2006).
119. Report of the Panel, United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported
Substances, [ 5.1.3-5.1.12, L/6175 (June 5, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136
(1987).
120. Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2006).
121. LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 85, at 33.
122. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b).
123. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1).
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competitors of domestic producers.124 The questionnaires are not
voluntary surveys. Any omissions and insufficiencies will militate
against the interests of foreign respondents, because the DOC
habitually relies on adverse information provided by the petitioners
(domestic producers) to fill in gaps. Such information is
euphemistically referred to as "facts available."'25 Therefore, foreign
respondents are forced to spend tremendous time, energy, and money
coping with this trying bureaucratic burden from a foreign
government.'26
In sum, an antidumping regime is a legalistic reincarnation of
protectionism. It stigmatizes otherwise legitimate business practices
under the label of "unfair trade," and, based on such label, it imposes
penalties resembling the remedies available for the torts of deceptive
conduct or patent violations.127 Fair trade rhetoric serves as a faqade
of legitimacy, which conceals the protectionist nature of antidumping
duties.'28 Once a group of domestic producers feel threatened by
cheap foreign imports, they accuse foreign producers of dumping, and
the ITC, in approximately eighty percent of all cases, issues an
affirmative preliminary ruling that dumped imports have caused or
threaten to cause injury to the petitioner.129
C. Detailing Protectionism: A Flawed Modus Operandi and Its
"Devilish Details"-130
The nuts and bolts of the antidumping statute contain numerous
technicalities in both calculating dumping margins and finding
injuries. Although these mechanics, including various means of
analysis and computation, may appear at first glance methodical or
124. Gunn, supra note 17, at 175.
125. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b).
126. Gunn, supra note 17, at 175-76.
127. Barcel6, supra note 94, at 502.
128. N. David Palmeter has eloquently demonstrated how antidumping laws
masquerade as anti-unfair competition laws. See N. David Palmeter, Competition Policy
and Unfair Trade: First Do No Harm, 49 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 417, 418 (1994); N. David
Palmeter, The Antidumping Law: A Legal and Administrative Nontariff Barrier, in DOWN
IN THE DUMPS: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAWS 64, 65-66, 82 (Richard
Boltuck & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991); N. David Palmeter, The Rhetoric and Reality of the
United States Antidumping Law, 14 WORLD ECON. 19, 19-20, 35-36 (1991); N. David
Palmeter, The Antidumping Emperor, 22 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 6-7 (1988). In fact,
proponents of antidumping remedies deny that these remedies serve a protectionist
purpose. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 179 (1974) ("This Act is not a 'protectionist'
statute designed to bar or restrict U.S. imports; rather, it is a statute designed to free U.S.
imports from unfair price discrimination practices.").
129. LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 85, at 2.
130. Id.
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even scientific, they often prove difficult to comprehend. Therefore,
they constitute nearly a self-justifying system, which is vested with
vast administrative discretion and is immune to routine challenges
from outside."' J. Michael Finger aptly observed that
[t]he mind's eye can see a computer, programmed to run
through the various iterations of the ways in which dumping,
injury, industry, and other technicalities of a case might be
specified. Having multiple ways to specify the technicalities
mean that there is always another combination to try each time
the computer receives a "No" response from the government; it
just ticks over to the next iteration.'32
Ironically, however, by scrutinizing these technicalities, which
have been dubbed the "devilish details," '133 one may unveil the
antidumping regime's deceitful fair trade rhetoric and expose its
substantive and procedural protectionism.' This will lead people to




As discussed above, injuries caused by dumped imports are an
essential element of antidumping remedies. No matter how unfair or
illegal a foreign import may be, it is off the antidumping radar as long
as it causes no injury to rival domestic industries. The injury
requirement is a logical corollary of the antidumping remedies'
rationale to protect competitors rather than competition itself.1
36
Therefore, antidumping remedies focus not on objective injuries to
competition, such as those from predatory pricing, but on subjective
injuries to domestic producers. The problem, however, is that such
subjective injuries may also come from normal (fair) competition, not
131. BIERWAGEN, supra note 25, at 158 (noting that legislation and jurisprudence of
antidumping may generate a misleading impression that sophisticated rules would lead to
rule-oriented and fair outcome when those rules are subject to wide discretion and thus
vulnerable to abuse).
132. J. Michael Finger, Antidumping Is Where the Action Is, in ANTIDUMPING: How
IT WORKS AND WHO GETS HURT 3 (J. Michael Finger ed., 1993).
133. LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 85, at 2.
134. Barcel6, supra note 94, at 520-22.
135. BRIAN HINDLEY & PATRICK A. MESSERLIN, ANTIDUMPING INDUSTRIAL
POLICY: LEGALIZED PROTECTIONISM IN THE WTO AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 28
(1996).
136. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (delivering the same
observation from the antitrust perspective).
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necessarily from the alleged unfair trade. 37  Nonetheless, the
competitor-oriented antidumping statutes make it easier for domestic
antidumping authorities, such as the ITC, to find injuries even when
such injuries are unreal, because they are not directly connected to
the alleged dumping.'38
Two conditions should be met to locate an injury under a given
situation: injured party (injury to whom) and extent of injury (how
much injury). The U.S. antidumping statute stipulates that an injury
caused by dumped imports should be attributed to those domestic
industries that produce "like products" of the dumped imports.139
Therefore, a domestic salt producer may not claim injury caused by
an allegedly dumped sugar import. In addition, such injury should be
more than de minimis; it should be "material," consequential, and
important. 140  However, these two parameters are inherently
ambiguous, leaving the ITC enormous discretion that may be
hijacked for protectionist purposes. 4' Below is an illustrative list of
phantom injuries.
First, no standardized test exists to determine whether the target
of an antidumping investigation and the petitioner's domestic product
are like products. Petitioners can freely manipulate such likeness in a
way that best serves their protectionist purpose. Therefore, there is
no objective likeness test, such as the cross-elasticity of demand test
used in antitrust. 42 This deficiency makes the ITC's injury test
inevitably arbitrary and leads to incongruous results. For example,
although galvanized carbon steel sheeting is not like ungalvanized
carbon steel sheeting, galvanized carbon steel wire nails are like
ungalvanized carbon steel wire nails. 4' In addition, petitioners tend
to narrowly define the affected market, and thus industry, to
aggrandize the injuries.1" For example, when the same imported
goods are both marketed as a final product in the merchant market
and used to produce other downstream products (captive
137. Wood, supra note 107, at 1153.
138. Barcel6, supra note 94, at 514-16.
139. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (2006).
140. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A).
141. Bhala, supra note 98, at 47-48. Even an ardent advocate of the antidumping
regime admits that an injury determination by the ITC is unpredictable. Terence P.
Stewart, U.S.-Japan Economic Disputes: The Role of Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Laws, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 689, 726 (1999).
142. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
143. Wood, supra note 107, at 1153.
144. Bhala, supra note 98, at 107.
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production), petitioners will only focus on the merchant market sales
in the antidumping petition to raise their odds for success.
145
Second, a more serious problem lies in the lax, or often lacking,
analysis of "causation" between dumping and alleged injury.
146
Astoundingly, the injury need not actually be caused by dumping: it
only needs to be "by reason of" dumping.47 This nearly nonexistent
causation requirement is a true blessing to petitioners, who need not
demonstrate that dumping is the "sole or even primary" cause of
injury.14  Therefore, even if a domestic industry's injury or loss of
profit results mainly from consumers' changed habits or severe
competition among domestic producers,49 the industry can easily
raise its fingers to foreign producers and associate its injury with their
alleged dumping. 5 ° Under this soft causation standard, the majority
of ITC commissioners do not use any economic analysis, but instead
rely on a gut test to determine the existence of injury in specific
cases.15 ' For example, the commissioners may view an increase of
imports for three years in a row as evidence of a causal relation
between imports and injuries.'52
Third, even in the absence of actual material injury, petitioners
can initiate an antidumping investigation and obtain a protective
action by demonstrating a mere threat of injury.'53 This inherently
inferential concept requires the ITC's "prognostication" and thus
attracts protectionist abuse by petitioners.'54 Under this threat of
injury, any foreign imports can be subject to a potential trade
restriction, even before they are shipped to the U.S. market.
145. Id.; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv) (2006) (setting forth that the International
Trade Commission should focus "primarily on the merchant market for the domestic like
product" to determine market share).
146. See Wood, supra note 107, at 1161 (observing the disagreement among the
Commissioners of the International Trade Commission over the causation issue).
147. 19 U.S.C. § 1673.
148. Bhala, supra note 98, at 51-52.
149. "It is to be expected that when an industry expands from three to nine producers
within a short period of time, severe price competition will be experienced as the new
producers strive to obtain a share of the existing market." Pressure Sensitive Plastic Tapes
from Italy, Determination of Injury or Likelihood Thereof, 42 Fed. Reg. 44, 854-55 (Sept.
7, 1977).
150. Bhala, supra note 98, at 52-53.
151. Susan W. Liebeler, Import Relief on Imports from the People's Republic of China,
12 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 14, 27 (1989).
152. Id.
153. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, art. 3.7, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter Implementation of Article VI]; 19 U.S.C. § 1677(F)(i) (2006).
154. Bhala, supra note 98, at 104-06
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Understandably, petitioners usually, almost in a default fashion,
include this threat claim in their petitions.155
Fourth, injuries can be accumulated from multiple sources
(countries) in order to bestow on domestic industries a maximum
level of protection. As a result, even small-scale exporters can be
determined to dump after their products are lumped together with
those of other producers in the dumping investigation. 56 This
cumulation practice seems to be unfair to these small-scale producers
in that they are penalized as dumpers even if their exports alone
would not cause any damage to domestic rivals.
Fifth, an unfortunate change was made during the Uruguay
Round negotiation and enshrined as Article 3.4 of the WTO
Antidumping Agreement. 57 Article 3.4 mandates that the ITC
consider the "magnitude of the margin of dumping" in its injury
determination, which makes the ITC more likely to find injuries when
the Commerce Department has come up with a large dumping
margin.
15 8
In sum, these lax injury standards offer the ITC various routes to
locate phantom injuries. Not surprisingly, most domestic industries
competing with alleged dumped imports are not truly injured by
unfair imports. Federal Trade Commission economists Morris E.
Morkre and Kenneth H. Kelly demonstrated that, out of 179 cases
decided by the ITC from 1980 through 1988, only 21 cases involved
revenue losses greater than 10 percent.'59
2. Phantom Prices
In addition to injury, an importing government should find the
existence of dumping before imposing antidumping duties on
imported products. While the ITC determines the existence of injury,
the ITA within the DOC investigates and decides whether foreign
155. Id.
156. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv); see also Fundicao Tupy S.A. v. United States, 859 F.2d
915, 917 (1988).
157. Implementation of Article VI, supra note 153, art. 3.4.
158. Id.; see also Bhala, supra note 98, at 104; Christopher M. Dumler, Anti-dumping
Laws Trash Supercomputer Competition, 1997 CATO INST. BRIEFING PAPER No. 32,
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp-032.html ("[W]hen the ITA finds large
dumping margins.., the ITC is almost obliged to find material injury.").
159. MORRIS E. MORKRE & KENNETH H. KELLY, FED. TRADE COMM'N, EFFECTS OF
UNFAIR IMPORTS ON DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES: U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES, 1980 TO 1988, at 69 (1994); see also Press Release, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, FTC Staff Study Estimates That Dumped, Subsidized Imports Do Not
Cause Severe Injury in Most U.S. Indus. (Feb. 18, 1994) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
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producers sold their products in the U.S. market at less than fair
value-dumped-and, if so, to what extent."6  Determining the
existence of dumping and its magnitude logically requires the
comparison of two "prices." The first price, which is labeled "normal
value" ("NV"), is a normative, fair price, which should have been set
in the home (exporting) market without any alleged unfair
governmental intervention or other such practices.' The other price,
which is labeled "export price" ("EP"), is the actual price offered in
the importing country's domestic market, which is the U.S. price.162
The difference between these two prices constitutes the dumping
margin.
The problem is that prices are always fluctuating, which
complicates the determination on price discrimination (dumping).
The concept of normal value itself sounds somewhat oxymoronic in
the free market system, because prices constantly rise and fall
according to the force of supply and demand. This situation makes it
hard to fix a price for a normative reason. Moreover, most
antidumping cases, at least in the United States, concern the situation
in which the imported products at issue are not sold in the exporting
countries (developing countries). 63 In other words, there exists no
"sanctuary market" in the exporting country, where government
favoritism or intervention unduly creates price differences."
Accordingly, common sense dictates that there should be no
''comparison" at all for the sake of determining the existence of
dumping and its margin, because one of two subjects for comparison
does not exist. Nonetheless, the antidumping regime's protectionist
mission still forces the DOC to locate the "next most similar"
products.165  At this stage, the DOC's own logic and philosophy
replaces common sense. The DOC uses its self-designed product
code, coined "CONNUM," which categorizes distinctive
characteristics or properties of each given product, such as rubber or
plastic and small or big, and conducts the so-called "model
matching" 166 to obtain two entities to be compared.
160. 19 U.S.C. § 1673.
161. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, IMPORT ADMINISTRATION ANTIDUMPING MANUAL,
ch. VI, at 4 (1997), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/admanual/admanual-ch06.pdf.
162. Id.
163. LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 85, at 6.
164. The sanctuary market is a "closed home market" where foreign producers earn
profits only due to government subsidization or other intervention. Id. at 23; Stewart,
supra note 141, at 699.
165. LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 85, at 6.
166. Id.
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Even assuming, arguendo, that the DOC can come up with two
matching models to be compared, obtaining their prices requires yet
another layer of fiction. As discussed above, actual market prices are
hard to fix. Prices can be individual, specific, or averaged. Prices of
today can be different from those of yesterday. One can pay a lot less
for the same product in an outlet mall compared to a department
store. Products are often on sale for various reasons. Therefore, in
order to obtain prices to determine the existence of dumping and the
dumping margin, the DOC conducts a "dizzying variety of
adjustments." '167 The basic methodology is to strip final sale prices of
all post-production expenses to acquire the so-called "ex-factory"
prices. These post-production expenses include various discounts or
rebates, transportation and advertisement costs, and other direct and
indirect selling expenses.'68
Although the use of these ex-factory prices aims for an equi-
dimensional, or "apples-to-apples," comparison, a combination of
factors-including the above-mentioned fictitious "model matching"
practice, the inherent multiplicity of prices, and, finally, the DOC's
unrestricted discretion in the price adjustment process-tend to entail
"apples-to-oranges" comparisons. 6 9 For example, when the DOC
compares the U.S. sale prices with third country sale prices when an
investigated product is not sold in the home market, a dumping
margin may easily be found solely on the grounds that the third
country prices become higher due to the third country's invisible
trade barriers, which have nothing to do with unfair practices by the
accused dumper.70
This arbitrariness in calculating prices culminates when the DOC
"constructs" prices.17' When the model matching or third-party
167. Id. at 7, 21-24. In the same line, Bhala observes that, no matter how identical
imported products may be at the time they enter into the U.S. market, they are
subsequently subject to totally different commercial trajectories, which affect cost and
prices. Bhala, supra note 98, at 38-45 (detailing various kinds of adjustments over both
home market prices and U.S. prices).
168. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(A)-(B) (2006); 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(2)(A); 19
C.F.R. § 351.402(b) (2008) (regarding the addition of export costs such as freight charges,
insurance premiums, import duties, and warehouse expenses to the U.S. price); 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.41 (regarding the addition of preshipment expenses to the U.S. price); 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.41(d)(1)(iii) (regarding the addition of sales taxes to the U.S. price); 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.56(a) (regarding the circumstances of sale adjustment over the home market price);
19 C.F.R. § 353.57(a) (regarding the difference in merchandise ("DIFMER") adjustment
over the home market price); 19 C.F.R. § 353.58 (regarding the level of trade adjustment
over the home market price).
169. LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 85, at 8, 22.
170. Id.
171. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e).
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product comparison does not work, and the DOC designates an
exporting country as a nonmarket economy ("NME"), the DOC itself
computes, but more accurately legislates, archetypal prices to be used
in determining the existence of dumping and the dumping margin.1
2
Here, the DOC wields enormous discretion in assigning all relevant
costs for production, ranging from raw material, labor, and capital, as
well as producers' profits.173 No doubt, such construction is biased
toward findings of dumping. In many situations, the DOC relies on
information and data provided by no one but petitioners in the name
of "facts available."'74  In addition, the profit rates that the DOC
adopts in the construction of prices are often higher than in reality.'75
In sum, even if one supposes that dumping in the form of price
discrimination is a condemnable practice, the process of "fair market
comparison" to determine the existence of such dumping is not, in
fact, fair at all. Because both foreign and domestic price information
is often unobtainable, it is manipulated or constructed by the DOC.
Yet this artificial price information is exactly what the DOC purports
to be comparing. Lindsey and Ikenson observed that
[i]n the typical antidumping investigation, the DOC compares
home-market and U.S. prices of physically different goods, in
different kinds of packaging, sold at different times, in different
and fluctuating currencies, to different customers at different
levels of trade, in different quantities, with different freight and
other movement costs, different credit terms, and other
differences in directly associated selling experiences (e.g.,
commissions, warranties, royalties, and advertising). Is it any
wonder that the prices aren't identical?
17 6
On top of these structural problems, numerous bureaucratic
technicalities employed by the DOC contribute to an affirmative
finding of dumping by making home market value (normal value)
higher and/or the U.S. market value (export price) lower. First of all,
the DOC excludes most sales by domestic producers made at prices
below the production cost ("below-cost" sales) in calculating normal
value.'77 Such practice makes it easier to find dumping by ultimately
172. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (concerning below cost sales); 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)
(concerning nonmarket economies).
173. 19 C.F.R. § 351.405 (calculation of normal value based on constructed value); 19
C.F.R. § 351.407 (calculation of constructed value and cost of production).
174. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a); LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 85, at 20.
175. LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 85, at 29.
176. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
177. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b)(1).
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exaggerating normal value, especially considering the fact that below-
cost sales are not subtracted in calculating the U.S. home price unless
such sales constitute at least twenty percent of total sales. 78
However, this special treatment of "below-cost" sales as
something in the extraordinary course of trade is without any
economic rationale, because, as discussed above, firms often engage
in sales at a loss for a variety of legitimate reasons, such as launching
their products in a new market. 179 This below-cost production makes
perfect economic sense if one takes a closer look at firms' cost
structure, especially the fact that what often matters in a firm's
decision making is "variable," not "total," cost of production. 8 ° In
the absence of evidence that these firms aim for predatory pricing, the
practice of below-cost sales must be allowed in the same fashion that
airplane companies often undersell each other. Even more
problematic is that the power to decide whether to disregard below-
cost sales in calculating normal value is at the total discretion of the
DOC. 1
81
Second, because the antidumping remedy is based on an
aggregate, collective notion of injuries to domestic industries, fair
market comparison requires summing up each dumping margin
separately calculated from sales in each different category (model or
type) of the same product. Therefore, if such comparison is really
fair, any possible negative dumping margins in some categories, which
indicates that the U.S. market price is higher than the home market
price, should be allowed to offset other positive dumping margins
from other categories. However, under a well-established and even
judicially endorsed practice 8 2 labeled "zeroing," the DOC disallows
such offsetting by ignoring any negative dumping margins.'83 The
178. LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 85, at 23.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
180. Bhala, supra note 98, at 72-75.
181. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b)(2)-(3).
182. Corus Staal B.V. v. Dep't of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(affirming the deference given to the DOC in calculating dumping margins and declining
to be influenced by WTO decisions).
183. The WTO has recently struck down certain zeroing practices by the DOC. See
Appellate Body Report, United States-Laws, Regulations, and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing"), 263, WT/DS294/AB/R (Apr. 18, 2006),
available at http://www.wto.int/englishl/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/ds294_e.htm (follow
"Appellate Body Report" link; then follow "E" link). The DOC has vowed to discontinue
the practice. See Panel Report, United States-Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp from
Ecuador, 6, WT/DS335/8 (Jan. 30, 2007), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/dispu-e/casese/ds335_e.htm (follow "Panel Report" link, then follow
"E" link). However, it remains to be seen whether the courts and Congress will follow
suit. See Posting of Daniel Ikenson to Cato@Liberty, Antidumping Reformers Rejoice,
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zeroing practice tends to inflate the actual impact of dumping.
Likewise, nondumped sales in the U.S. market do not offset dumped
ones, thereby increasing the possibility of the DOC finding
dumping.' 84
Third, any fair market comparison should maintain
methodological coherence in calculations between the home market
and the U.S. price. Therefore, "average" home market prices should
be compared with "average" U.S. prices, and "individual" home
market prices with "individual" U.S. prices. However, the DOC
often makes another deviation from this normative track and
compares "average" home market prices with "individual" U.S.
prices. Therefore, even if "average" U.S. prices exceed "average"
home market prices, and no dumping exists, the DOC still creates
dumping margins by selecting a couple of low-priced anecdotal
transactions in the U.S."s5 This scenario is most likely to occur under
an administrative review in which the DOC must determine whether
it should maintain or terminate its preexisting order.
186 The bottom
line is that the DOC can, and will, arrive at a finding that dumping
has occurred one way or another, if it so desires.
All in all, the classic theory of justice articulated by Aristotle
dictates that equals should be treated equally and unequals
unequally.8 7 Yet, a premise logically superseding this heuristic is that
one should be able to determine whether the two subjects in question
are equal or unequal before conferring on them equal or unequal
treatment. If one attempts to square an unequal to an equal, any
subsequent treatment based on this flawed designation is pre-
ordained to be unjust. In other words, certain situations do not even
warrant a comparison between what is to be compared. The
fundamental defect of the antidumping regime originates from its
brazen comparison of what should not be compared. This flaw
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2006/12/18/antidumping-reformers-rejoice/ (Dec. 18, 2006,
19:16 EST).
184. See Davey, supra note 98, at 298-99; Letter from Consumers for World Trade to
U.S. Congress (Jan. 31, 2005), available at http://www.cwt.org/news/articles/2005%
20March/Blast%20fax%20on%2OZeroing%20Jan05.pdf.
185. See Richard Boltuck & Robert E. Litan, America's "Unfair" Trade Laws, in
DOWN IN THE DUMPS: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAWS 1, 14 (Richard
Boltuck & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
186. Bhala, supra note 98, at 69.
187. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 67-84 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett
Publishing Co., 2d ed. 1999) (1985).
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explains the DOC's astonishingly high affirmative determination rate
against foreign producers over alleged foreign dumping practices. 188
3. Procedural Burdens and Injustice
The investigatory process of antidumping is inherently biased
against respondents (foreign producers) in the sense that petitioners
(domestic producers) are teamed up with the antidumping authorities
(DOC and ITC) throughout the investigatory process. 189 Therefore,
impartiality or other due process values, which are the backbone of
any adjudicatory or quasi-adjudicatory proceeding, cannot be
anticipated from the antidumping authorities. For example, unlike a
normal litigation setting, petitioners in their own antidumping
proceeding are free from heavy burdens of discovery, because the
antidumping authorities perform an investigation. 9 ° Antidumping
authorities even work with petitioners before they initiate their
petition to ensure that the petition is "legally sufficient."''
In addition, due process and other procedural safeguards cannot
be fully implemented in an antidumping proceeding. The
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") does not apply to an
antidumping suit.'92 Also, the whole investigatory process is subject
to a strict timetable,'93 which tends to militate against the interests of
foreign respondents because tight deadlines deprive them of adequate
time to defend their cases. For example, foreign respondents have
only forty-five days to respond to the DOC's questionnaire.'94 In
order to fully respond to such a questionnaire, foreign respondents
need lawyers, economists, accountants, and translators. 195
188. Dumler, supra note 158 (observing that the DOC rendered dumping
determinations in over ninety-six percent of cases-804 out of 837 petitions-filed from
1980 to 1997).
189. Hilary K. Josephs, The Multinational Corporation, Integrated International
Production, and the United States Dumping Laws, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 51, 65-66
(1997).
190. See Theodore W. Kassinger, Antidumping Duty Investigations, in LAW AND
PRACTICE OF UNITED STATES REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1, 2 (Charles
R. Johnston, Jr. ed., 1989); Josephs, supra note 189, at 65-66.
191. Josephs, supra note 189, at 66; Kassinger, supra note 190, at 16.
192. Elof Hansson, Inc. v. United States, 41 Cust. Ct. 519, 528 (1958) (ruling that the
APA was not applicable to dumping investigations); see Josephs, supra note 189, at 66;
Kassinger, supra note 190, at 16-20.
193. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b) (2006) (requiring the preliminary determination be made
forty-five days from the date of filing); 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(1) (setting the general rule
that final determinations by the DOC are to be made seventy-five days after the
preliminary determination).
194. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a)(2)(A)(i).
195. Gunn, supra note 17, at 175.
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Therefore, the responding process costs respondents a vast
amount of time, money, and energy. If the respondent ever lapses on
the aforementioned deadline, the DOC will use data provided by
petitioners ("facts available"), which is predictably self-serving and
adverse to the interests of foreign producers. 196 Even if domestic
industries fail to prevail in the first round of an antidumping
complaint, they can refile a new petition with the same subject matter,
because the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not
apply to antidumping proceedings, unlike other civil proceedings.197
This "procedural protectionism" 19' results from a captured trade
policy under which domestic interest groups persuade the U.S.
Congress to change various procedures, such as time limits or
deadlines, to the detriment of foreign rivals.1 99 Capitalizing on these
time limits, antidumping petitioners often "overload" the system by
filing loads of cases beyond the government's capacity in a hope that
the government is forced to broker settlements, such as Voluntary
Export Restraints ("VERs"), between petitioners and foreign
producers, rather than determine the merits of the cases."0
This procedural injustice, which is potential harassment to
foreign producers, severely distorts trade flows and often forces them
to raise export prices to avoid antidumping investigations. In other
words, a mere threat of filing antidumping petitions or initiating
antidumping investigations may chill foreign producers' entry into the
market or force cooperation with domestic producers on pricing, even
in the absence of actual imposed antidumping duties. In fact, this
threat is very effective in forming a cartel: while petitioners can abuse
the antidumping proceeding with very little cost, the anticompetitive
damage to consumers and the entire economy is "significant and
durable."'20
Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak empirically proved the
occurrence of these trade distortions before the final determination of
196. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b); see Wesley K. Caine, A Case for Repealing the Antidumping
Provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BuS. 681, 698 (1981).
197. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(a), 1673a(a); Josephs, supra note 189, at 66.
198. Barcel6, supra note 94, at 522; Joe Sims & Edith E. Scott, Antitrust Consequences
to Private Parties of Participation in and Settlement of Selected Trade Actions, 56
ANTITRUST L.J. 561, 575 (1987).
199. SHARYN O'HALLORAN, POLITICS, PROCESS AND AMERICAN TRADE POLICY
181 (1994)
200. Finger, supra note 132, at 5.
201. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE NOERR-
PENNINGTON DOCTRINE: AN FTC STAFF REPORT 3 (2006) [hereinafter FTC STAFF
REPORT]; see Susan A. Creighton et al., Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975, 977-87,
990-92 (2005).
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dumping and injury. Their research examined the presence of
pending investigations (the "investigation effect") and the suspension
of investigations in exchange for foreign producers' commitment to
raise export prices (the "suspension effect"). 2 ' They observed that
many domestic producers file antidumping petitions as a means of
harassing foreign producers into cooperation rather than as an
attempt to procure the actual imposition of final duties.0 3
Shi Young Lee and Sung Hee Jun have also demonstrated this
investigation effect through their research, yet in a more dynamic
fashion. First, they show that a petitioner's mere initiation of an
antidumping complaint can increase the uncertainty for the "trade
prospects" as to targeted products, since an importer might be forced
to pay antidumping duties in the future.2" These additional
transaction costs created by uncertainty tend to drive the export
production to other non-petitioned foreign producers ("first order
investigation effect").0 5 Yet, news of the petition will soon reach
non-petitioned foreign producers who export competitive or
substitutable products. Even though the petition does not directly
affect these non-targeted foreign producers, they nonetheless tend to
fear any possible future petitions toward themselves.0 6 This fear may
be explained by a social psychology phenomenon called "priming
effects," under which the salience of the previous event influences, or
"primes," a non-targeted foreign producer's perception of risks.207
Therefore, even non-targeted firms tend to reduce their exports or
raise their prices to avoid any possible antidumping attacks in the
future. This is called the "second order investigation effect."2 8
Thus, the antidumping mechanism inflicts high costs and
uncertainty on foreign exporters throughout its investigatory
process.2"9 It also tends to convert the U.S. adversarial system of
justice into an inquisitorial one, which is biased against respondents
(foreign producers).210 As Frederick Davis avowed forty years ago,
"this area of law condones practices inconsistent with due process and
202. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, Differences in the Uses and Effects of
Antidumping Law Across Import Sources, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN
TRADE POLICY 385, 386-87 (Anne 0. Krueger ed., 1996).
203. Id.
204. Staiger & Wolak, supra note 202, at 386-87.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 434-37.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See Finger, supra note 29, at 34.
210. Gunn, supra note 17, at 176.
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equal protection notions that are so punctiliously observed in other
areas of the public law. 211  Without proper checks on this
administrative abuse, the antidumping remedy results in
maltreatment of foreign producers.212
II. Two FAILURES OF THE ANTIDUMPING REGIME
A. Economic Factionism
James Madison began the Federalist Paper No. 10 by submitting
that, "among the numerous advantages promised by a well
constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed
than its tendency to break and control the violence of 
faction. 213
Antidumping remedies embody the very evil that Madison so
passionately preached against. Without any true foundation for their
ostensible "fair trade" rationale, as discussed above,
214 antidumping
remedies have become "little more than an excuse for special
interests to shield themselves from competition at the expense of both
American consumers and other American companies.,
215  Through
antidumping measures, federal economic welfare is hijacked by a
handful of special interests, which can be depicted as economic
"factions. "216 Therefore, antidumping remedies precipitate a
Madisonian failure by the government itself.
217
Unbeknownst to them, American consumers are forced to pay
higher prices for their everyday purchases, including candles, shrimp,
and computers, due to additional antidumping duties, while such
overpayment enriches only a small group of producers, who are losing
211. Davis, supra note 109, at 1440; see also James A. Kohn, The Antidumping Act: Its
Administration and Place in American Trade Policy, 60 MICH. L. REV. 407, 421-27 (1962)
(discussing that the Antidumping Act establishes no procedural guidance for the Secretary
of the Treasury to consider when deciding whether dumping has occurred or injured an
industry).
212. See Davis, supra note 109, at 1460.
213. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
214. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
215. N. Gregory Mankiw & Philip L. Swagel, Antidumping: The Third Rail of Trade
Policy, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2005, at 107.
216. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Chairman Oliver Says Protectionism
Not Justified, Does Not Save Jobs, Actually Hurts Economy (April 24, 1987), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/F87/oliveraei.txt; U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Policy
Issues in Int'l Trade & Commodities Study Series No. 9, Antidumping & Countervailing
Procedures-Use or Abuse: Implications for Developed Countries, iii, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/10 (Feb. 12, 2000) (prepared by Inge Nora Neufeld).
217. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note 216 ("[T]he special interests
... have invented a national problem in order to advance their own interests.").
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competitive edges but are nonetheless protected by these trade
remedies. 18 This "protection tax 219 has inflicted massive damage
upon the U.S. economy. Raj Bhala pointed to the ITC's candid
analysis of the antidumping regime's negative effect on the welfare of
the U.S. economy. 22° The ITC estimated that, as of 1991, outstanding
antidumping and countervailing duty orders deprived the U.S.
economy of about $1.6 billion. Furthermore, the burden falls
disproportionately onto the poor, because targeted consumer goods
are often necessities, which tend to constitute a bigger portion of the
poor's spending than the rich. 21
Economic harms inflicted by antidumping remedies are also felt
by American companies and their workers. Because most
antidumping tariffs are imposed on parts and intermediary goods,
which are used to produce other goods, producers of these final goods
(the so-called "downstream" firms), such as automobile companies,
face steeper costs. 2 2 For example, even if automakers no longer use
imported steel, they still have to pay higher steel prices, because
domestic steel prices have soared in light of antidumping measures.223
As a result, each steel job saved by these antidumping tariffs costs an
estimated three jobs in steel-consuming industries.24 For the same
reason, in the early 1990s, Toshiba closed its California laptop
factories and moved to Japan after the 62.7% antidumping tariffs
were imposed on flat-panel displays.225  All in all, antidumping
remedies "impose[] disparate transaction costs" on parties concerned,
resulting in a failure to achieve an optimal level of resource allocation
in the national economy.2 26
Furthermore, the remedial (protectionist) effect of antidumping
measures may be questionable even to their ostensible beneficiaries.
While antidumping measures may allow inefficient firms to sustain
218. See CONSUMERS FOR WORLD TRADE, PROTECTIONISM IN AMERICA: WATCH
YOUR WALLET (2003), available at http://www.cwt.org/learn/CWT%20Protection%20
Tax%20Study.pdf.
219. Id.
220. Bhala, supra note 98, at 11-12; The Economic Effects of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension Agreements, USITC Pub. 2900, Inv. No. 332-
344, at ix (June 1995).
221. Mankiw & Swagel, supra note 215, at 108.




226. See KEVIN SCOTT MARSHALL, ADMINISTERED PROTECTION: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF U.S. COUNTERVAILING DUTY AND ANTIDUMPING REGULATION 174
(1993).
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themselves temporarily, they tend to eventually harm those firms in
the long run.2 7 Antidumping measures send the wrong signals to the
firms' shareholders and employees, depriving them of any
entrepreneurial efforts, such as restructuring.228  Moreover,
protectionism sustained by antidumping remedies appears quite
addictive.229 Once in place, antidumping measures are hard to
revoke, despite statutory possibilities under a "sunset review"
conducted every five years. 230  The U.S. trade law was amended
during the 1970s and 1980s to make it easier to find dumping by
adding special rules, such as the exclusion of below-cost sales and the
use of constructed value. 23 ' The DOC repealed antidumping tariffs in
only two of the 314 cases that it examined under the sunset review
between 1998 and 2000.232 Therefore, as of December 1999, Chinese
"cotton shop towels" and Japanese "television receivers" had been
continuously subject to an antidumping order ever since October
1983 and March 1971, respectively.233
The foregoing self-reinforcing propensity of antidumping
remedies prompted the passing of the United States Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000,3 which is commonly
known as the "Byrd Amendment," after its chief architect, Robert
Byrd.2 35 Though it has since been repealed, the Byrd Amendment,
when it was in effect, required the U.S. government to disperse
antidumping duties to petitioners on an annual basis.
236
Unsurprisingly, this extraordinary financial incentive has dramatically
boosted antidumping petitions ever since its enactment.237 Even some
227. THOMAS BODDEZ & MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, UNFINISHED BUSINESS:
REFORMING TRADE REMEDY LAWS IN NORTH AMERICA 169 (1993).
228. MARSHALL, supra note 226, at 174.
229. Id.
230. BOVARD, supra note 14, at 140; Bhala, supra note 98, at 115-16; Mankiw &
Swagel, supra note 215, at 112; Barbara R. Stafford & Linda S. Chang, The Sunset
Provisions, Mortality and the Uruguay Round, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS
ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 721, 727 n.12 (PLI 1994).
231. LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 85, at 104.
232. Mankiw & Swagel, supra note 215, at 112.
233. Neufeld, supra note 216, at 8.
234. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Byrd Amendment), Pub. L.
No. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549A (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (2006)).
235. United States International Trade Commission, Trade Remedy Investigations:
Byrd Amendment, http://www.usitc.gov/trade-remedy/731-ad-701-cvd/byrd.htm (last
visited Dec. 14, 2008).
236. Id.
237. Kenneth J. Pierce & Matthew R. Nicely, Case Studies: Catfish and Shrimp
Antidumping Cases, Presentation at the Georgetown University Law Center Nat'l
Committee for Int'l Econ. Cooperation, World Trade Organization: Accession and
Membership Conference 1-5 (Mar. 11, 2004), http://www.usvtc.org/trade/other/
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government agencies have warned against the devastating economic
effects that the Byrd Amendment has caused to the U.S economy.
The Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") stated that
[t]he law subsidizes the output of some firms at the expense of
others, leading to inefficient use of capital, labor, and other
resources of the economy. It discourages settlement of cases by
U.S. firms and will lead to increased expenditure of economic
resources on administration, legal representation of parties, and
various other costs associated with the operation of the
antidumping and countervailing-duty laws.23 8
Although this law had already been struck down as an illegal
extension of antidumping measures by the WTO,2 3 9 its unusual
popularity in Capitol Hill has made it slow to disappear until
recently.24° It is reported that seven of the nine newly-elected
senators officially supported the Byrd Amendment in February
2005.241 The U.S. economy suffered as U.S. trading partners decided
to retaliate against U.S. exports because of the nation's
noncompliance with the WTO decision.242 This reciprocation reveals
another, much broader, negative ramification of antidumping
remedies to the U.S. economy. As long as the United States uses
NCIECmar04/ (follow power point presentation link under "Important Materials");
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, IMPORT INJURY
INVESTIGATIONS CASE STATISTICS (FY 1980-2005) 108 fig.2 (2006), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/trade-remedy/Report-10-06-PUB.pdf (showing an increase in
antidumping cases filed from thirty-five in 2000 to ninety-two in 2001) [hereinafter
"INJURY STATISTICS"].
238. Letter from Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Dir. of Cong. Budget Office, to Bill Thomas,
Chairman, Comm. on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 2, 2004),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/51xx/doc5l30/03-02-ThomasLetter.pdf.
239. Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset
Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003).
240. See Byrd-Brained, THE ECONOMIST, Sep. 4, 2004, at 69; Dan Ikenson,
"Byrdening" Relations: U.S. Trade Policies Continue to Flout the Rules, 2004 CATO INST.
FREE TRADE BULL. No. 5, available at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FTB-005.html
(depicting trade remedy laws, such as the Byrd Amendment, as the "sacred cow" of the
U.S. trade policy). The U.S. Congress finally repealed the Byrd Amendment in December
2005 (House) and in January 2006 (Senate) with a condition that permitted petitioners
(U.S. companies) to collect duties on goods that were imported to the United States prior
to October 1, 2007. See Press Release, Office of U.S. Trade Representative, Congress
Takes Important Action: Byrd Repeal Brings U.S. into Compliance with WTO Ruling
(Feb. 1, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases
/2006/February/Congress Takes Important Action.html.
241. Mankiw & Swagel, supra note 215, at 107.
242. See World Trade Organization, Arbitrator Issues Awards on "Byrd Amendment,"
Aug. 31, 2004, available at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news04_e/news04_e.htm
(allowing certain countries to apply for a "suspension of concessions and other
obligations" in light of the U.S. Byrd Amendment).
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antidumping remedies as its protectionist weapon, its trading partners
will follow suit and plague U.S. exporters with their own antidumping
investigations and duties.243 In sum, antidumping remedies leave the
United States with many self-inflicted wounds.
B. Cartelization: An Antitrust Failure
In addition to the foregoing consequences, antidumping
remedies tend to cause an antitrust breakdown by creating
oligopolistic pricing patterns. The purpose of the antidumping regime
is to discourage imports from being priced lower than their rival
domestic products. Hence, pro-competitive pricing strategies by
importers, such as "low introductory prices" or "experimental prices,"
are deterred, and, to that extent, new entries of foreign imports are
excluded.2  If those foreign producers decide to leave the domestic
market as a result of such penalizing antidumping duties, domestic
competitor petitioners can enjoy their preexisting price levels, which
are higher than what they would have been without the existence of
antidumping duties. After all, absent this price competition, domestic
prices remain stable, to the detriment of consumers and consuming
industries, while such fixed prices serve the narrow interests of a
handful of domestic producers.2 45  The anticompetitive effects of
exclusion and de facto price fixing can be easily attributed to the very
concept of "dumping margins," which, as a remedial criterion,
eventually determine the amount of duties foreign producers are
forced to pay for their alleged dumping.246 These extra duties tend to
increase domestic sale prices that would have otherwise been low.
Therefore, the antidumping statute promotes a "legal cartel," in
which the government itself monitors and enforces a de facto price-
fixing scheme for the benefit of domestic industries and to the
detriment of domestic consumers.247 Under this legal cartel, the mere
act of filing an antidumping petition may induce effective cooperation
243. LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 85, at 122-23; Mankiw & Swagel, supra note 215,
at 115 (citing research by Thomas Prusa and Susan Skeath).
244. See Barcel6, supra note 94, at 510-11.
245. Id. at 512; Davis, supra note 109, at 1444 (observing the potential clash between
antidumping and antitrust policies); see also Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the
Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y J. 1, 24 (1995) (observing that U.S. antidumping law tends to generate tensions with
U.S. antitrust policies by chilling low pricing in order to protect domestic industries).
246. Gunn, supra note 17, at 171-72.
247. Pierce, supra note 2, at 741-42.
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in price fixing among domestic and foreign producers.248
Antidumping petitions targeting imported products are usually filed
jointly by a certain critical mass of domestic producers producing
similar goods.249 In this joint effort to launch an antidumping
complaint, domestic producers naturally exchange information on
prices and output levels of their products. Such communication may
be the onset of a de facto price-fixing conspiracy. Recent oligopolistic
behaviors, such as "price leadership" by big companies and "open
pricing" through trade associations,25 ° also facilitate such collusive
communication. Under these circumstances, domestic producers can
comfortably engage in the so-called "conscious parallelism," in which
they can effectively coordinate their price and output decisions even
in the absence of overt illegal collusion.' Although these practices
may not be illegal as they stand, they nonetheless tend to provide a
fertile ground for collusive cooperation among domestic producers.
However, cartelization through an antidumping petition does not
remain purely a domestic phenomenon. The prototypical collusion
toward a de facto price-fixing cartel among antidumping petitioners
may soon expand to foreign producers who produce identical or
similar products. The message is blunt: if you raise your prices to a
level with which we feel comfortable, we will withdraw the
antidumping petition.252 Economists have long suspected collusions
among domestic and foreign producers when the former withdraw
their antidumping petitions after settlements with the latter.253
248. This "threat" effect may explain why there are so many frivolous antidumping
petitions that eventually result in a de minimis or zero dumping margin. See Gunn, supra
note 17, at 165 (arguing that petitioners should bear the costs of discovery and
investigation to eliminate "frivolous and protectionist" antidumping filings).
249. Petitioners may file jointly as an industry under 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1) (2006).
250. See FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 153-56, 160, 164, 209-10, 248-61, 347-59 (3d. ed. 1990).
251. Id. at 742; Donald Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 656 (1962).
252. See M. Herander & J.B. Schwartz, An Empirical Test of the Impact of the Threat of
U.S. Trade Policy: The Case of Antidumping Duties, 51 S. ECON. J. 59, 59-79 (1984); Ann
Harrison, The New Trade Protection: Price Effects of Antidumping and Countervailing
Measures in the United States (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 808,
2001); Christopher T. Taylor, The Economic Effects of Withdrawn Antidumping
Investigations: Is There Evidence of Collusive Settlements? 8 (Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Working Paper No. 240, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.govfbe/workpapers/wp240.pdf.
253. See T. Calvani & R.W. Tritell, Invocation of United States Import Relief Laws as
an Antitrust Violation, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 327, 527-50 (1986); T.J. Prusa, Why Are So
Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn? 33 J. INT'L ECON. 1, 1-20 (1992); P.B.
Rosendorf, Voluntary Export Restraints, Antidumping Procedure, and Domestic Politics,
86 AM. ECON. REV. 544, 544-61 (1996); Taylor, supra note 252, at 2-3; M. Zanardi,
Antidumping Law as a Collusive Device 2 (Boston College, Working Paper No. 487, 2000),
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Likewise, to terminate antidumping investigations against them,
foreign producers are often forced to conclude "price undertaking" or
"suspension agreements," the economic effect of which is close to
price fixing.
Why do foreign producers feel powerless when domestic
producers file antidumping petitions, and why are they willing to
settle rather than respond to dumping allegations and comply with
the ensuing investigations? An answer to this question may be found
in the Eastern District of New York's opinion in Music Center S.N.C.
Di Luciano Pisoni & C. v. Prestini Musical Instruments Corp:
These proceedings may pose a substantial burden on their
target. The foreign companies who are the subject of an
antidumping investigation are presented with questionnaires
seeking information about their selling practices, and, in many
cases, their cost of production as well. After submission of
questionnaire responses, these responses are verified by
Commerce officials. The verification process sometimes
involves up to five investigators reviewing source documents at
the respondents' corporate offices and factories for periods
ranging between three days and three weeks.254
In particular, small foreign companies as respondents often
cannot afford lawyers, accountants, and economists, which are
necessary to fully respond to the DOC's investigation, while the well-
monied petitioners can.255  The obverse side of this story is that
domestic industries may be willing to spend a handsome amount of
money in an antidumping suit against small foreign producers in
order to scare away these foreign producers from the domestic
market. This behavior, which is called "non-price predation," aims to
raise competitors' cost through specious litigations. 6
available at http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/WP487.pdf; see also Chad P. Bown, Trade
Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Why Are So Few
Challenged?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 515, 525 (2005).
254. Music Ctr. S.N.C. Di Luciano Pisoni & C. v. Prestini Musical Instruments Corp.,
874 F. Supp. 543, 547 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing de Ravel d'Esclapon, supra note 16, at 549);
see also Dumler, supra note 158 (observing that lengthy questionnaires (100 to 200 pages),
translation problems, American accounting standards, and a tight deadline for response
(two to four weeks) bring great pains to foreign respondents who would be penalized for
not cooperating by the DOC using information provided by petitioners).
255. See MARSHALL, supra note 226, at 174 (arguing that the disparate transaction
costs that the antidumping measure imposes tend to favor the interests of "highly
concentrated" industries to the detriment of "highly competitive" small producers).
256. See Calvani & Tritell, supra note 253, at 529 n.5; J. Hurwitz, Abuse of Government
Processes, the First Amendment, and the Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEO. L. J. 65, 70 (1985).
The Department of Justice also acknowledged these anticompetitive effects resulting from
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Non-price predation may be a superior alternative to price
predation for big domestic producers in many aspects. For example,
the former is relatively less expensive than the latter, since joint
petitioners can share the legal costs among themselves. 7 In addition,
while price predation costs are certain, there is no guarantee that
these costs can be recouped even with a monopoly, as there is always
the possibility of new entries to the market.25 8  Moreover, in the
antidumping context, petitioners can rely on the government to
absorb most costs through statutory proceedings.2 9 The DOC's own
practice of not screening spurious petitions in the filing stage
contributes to the potential proliferation of non-price predation in
antidumping proceedings 6.2  "[V]ery little (if any) predation is
accomplished through pricing, while a good deal is achieved through
litigation., 26 1 This non-price predation leads to the exclusion of more
efficient foreign rivals from the domestic market through means other
than "competition on the merits '262 and thus aims to achieve "willful
acquisition and maintenance of [monopoly] power.
263
The pain inflicted on foreign producers by this non-price
predation is so grave that they tend to react even to a mere threat of
an antidumping suit.2 6  In other words, even without actual
antidumping petitions, a mere prospect, or threat thereof, sensitizes
foreign producers in their pricing behaviors, forcing these producers
to put higher price tags on their exports to avoid any potential
antidumping attacks. This tacit communication can lead to an
antidumping procedures, stating "[i]t is often not the actual imposition of dumping duties
that inhibits foreign competition so much as the indeterminate liability that arises from the
filing of a dumping complaint." Administration of the Antidumping Act of 1921: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means Comm. on
Assessment and Collection of Duties under the Antidumping Act of 1921, 95th Cong., 243-
44 (1978).
257. Calvani & Tritell, supra note 253, at 529 n.5.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See de Ravel d'Esclapon, supra note 16, at 548.
261. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 201, at 38 (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 357 (1978)).
262. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147,
149 (2005) (citing 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
626g(3) (1st ed. 1978)).
263. Verizon Commc'n, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
264. James Pomeroy Hendrik, The United States Antidumping Act, 58 AM. J. INT'L L.
914, 919 (1964) (arguing that the mere initiation of a dumping investigation may lead
foreign producers to change their prices).
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effective price fixing.265 Moreover, domestic industries lobby the
government to establish VERs-which are nothing but cartels
266-
with foreign countries participating under the implied threat of
antidumping remedies.267
Some of the most preeminent antitrust scholars in the nation
have illustrated foreign producers' forced participation in the
cartelization. Frederick Scherer highlighted the way in which the
government contributed to a cartelization through antidumping
proceedings.268 Two New Mexico potash (potassium) producers filed
an antidumping suit against Canadian potash producers, in particular
the Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan ("PCS"), on February 10,
1987.269 Following the ITC's preliminary injury determination on
March 23, 1987, the DOC announced preliminary dumping margins
of fifty-two percent against the PCS. 27 ° The PCS was then required to
post huge bonds on future exports, covering duties tantamount to
these preliminary dumping margins.2 71 The PCS was soon forced to
increase its export price on potash in an attempt to reduce final
dumping margins and to pay the bonds to be posted.272 Other
Canadian producers followed suit, and potash prices spiked.273
Finally, Canadian potash producers concluded a "suspension
agreement" with the U.S. government, under which they agreed to fix
their export prices to the titular "fair market value" for the next five
years 4.27  This price hike (nearly one-hundred percent), which was
precipitated in the 1990s by an ongoing antidumping suit,
demonstrates the classic phenomenon of cartel-driven price fixing.275
The government's enforcement of price fixing through the
antidumping process made this cartel legal.
Richard Pierce introduced a case that vividly illustrates how the
"threat" of an antidumping suit may be used to compel foreign
265. Ulrich Immenga, Export Cartels and Voluntary Export Restraints Between Trade
and Competition Policy, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 93, 132-33 (1995).
266. Id. at 114.
267. Hoekman & Leidy, supra note 14, at 156.
268. See FREDERIC M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICY, DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL 20-22 (2000); Frederic M. Scherer, Some Principles for Post-Chicago
Antitrust Analysis, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 5, 9 (2001).
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producers to join a preexisting price-fixing cartel.276 In 1989, a price-
fixing cartel formed by U.S. ferrosilicon producers was challenged by
cheap imports from China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and
Venezuela. As discussed at the outset of this Article, U.S. producers
filed antidumping complaints against foreign producers and soon
succeeded in thwarting their access to the U.S. market.277 However,
such strategy failed to work when Brazilian producers tried to enter
the U.S. market in the early 1990s. 278  Although U.S. producers
initially succeeded in obtaining a favorable antidumping decision
against Brazilian exporters who had declined the U.S. producers'
invitation to join the cartel, the ITC eventually revoked this wrongly
imposed antidumping remedy as a whistleblower later divulged the
cartel to the public. 279 This case eloquently describes how effortlessly
domestic producers may abuse the antidumping proceeding for
anticompetitive purposes and how greatly the antidumping remedies
may contribute to the solidification of a preexisting cartel. Perhaps
this may explain why big steel companies such as Bethlehem Steel
and LTV Steel dominate antidumping petitions concerning steel in
the United States.28°  Considering the high success ratio for
antidumping suits,281 such dominance by big corporations in
antidumping petitions tends to oust relatively small foreign rivals.
In sum, antidumping actions facilitate cartelization. Without
antidumping actions, "it is difficult to create, maintain, and enforce a
price-fixing cartel. ' 282 Thanks to a statutorily stipulated antidumping
proceeding, which creates a legal cartel, domestic industries can
either deter noncartel members from advancing on the cartelized
market or force them to join the cartel. 83 Since a petition for an
antidumping investigation should be filed by a representative number
of companies producing like products, these companies tend to
discuss among themselves the prices and costs of foreign competitors
whose low prices threaten their own market shares.
276. Pierce, supra note 2, at 726-28.
277. See text accompanying notes 223-29.
278. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
279. Pierce, supra note 2, at 726-28.
280. Neufeld, supra note 216, at 12.
281. Bhala, supra note 98, at 106; Neufield, supra note 216, at 6-7.
282. Pierce, supra note 2, at 736.
283. Id. at 739-41.
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III. REMEDYING TRADE REMEDIES: OPTIONS AND OBSTACLES
A. Repealing or Revising the Antidumping Statute?
Confronting the aforementioned flaws and damages, a camp of
scholars, lawyers, and economists argue that the current antidumping
statute should be repealed2"4  and/or replaced by antitrust
regulations.285 Yet, these options tend to suffer either from political
infeasibility or lack of reform value. First, if the antidumping statute
is truly to protect domestic industries from any unfair foreign trade
practices involving restraints on trade or other monopolistic
behaviors, antitrust statutes, such as the Robinson-Patman Act,286
should apply to discipline such anticompetitive behavior. Under
these circumstances, however, domestic petitioners have to prove
foreign dumpers' "predatory intent," which is a tremendously
burdensome process, and they would certainly disfavor such an
option as sharply decreasing their chances for legal protection against
foreign competition.287 Domestic industries, which are accustomed to
a nearly automatic protection under antidumping remedies without
the burden of proving predatory intent, would not support such a
legislative change, which would be fatal to their interests.
Others argue that the antidumping statute should be replaced by
the current safeguard measures under section 201. However, section
201, as an exceptional trade remedy, requires a higher threshold in
demonstrating injuries to domestic producers-serious injuries, as
284. Raj Bhala extensively documents scholars who favor the repeal, or at least the
phase-out, of the antidumping regime. CHARLES K. ROWLEY ET AL., TRADE
PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 268 (1995); Bhala, supra note 98, at 14-15 n.56;
Wesley K. Caine, A Case for Repealing the Antidumping Provisions of the Tariff Act of
1930, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 681 (1981). Tomer Broude labeled these scholars who
call for the abolition of antidumping remedies as "abolitionists." Tomer Broude, An Anti-
Dumping "To Be or Not To Be" in Five Acts: A New Agenda for Research and Reform, 37
J. WORLD TRADE 305, 310 (2003).
285. See Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Competition, Competition
Policy, and the GATT, 17 WORLD ECON. 121, 123 (1994); Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros
C. Mavroidis, Dumping, Antidumping and Antitrust, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 27, 30 (1996)
[hereinafter Hoekman & Mavroidis, Dumping, Antidumping and Antitrust]; Patrick A.
Messerlin, Should Antidumping Rules Be Replaced by National or International
Competition Rules?, 18 J. WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 37, 37 (1995).
286. Robinson-Patman Act § 2, 29 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (2006)).
287. See Harvey M. Applebaum, The Interface of the Trade Laws and the Antitrust
Laws, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 479, 490-91 (1998).
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opposed to the antidumping measures' material injuries.2 8  This more
cumbersome standard tends to make legislators shun the proposal.
Some observers suggest using the material injury standard found in
the antidumping statute for safeguard measures.289 However, this
would be tantamount to merely changing the name of antidumping
remedies to safeguard measures, without a substantial redress of the
antidumping remedies' negative effects.
A more modest option may be to insert the "public interest"
clause in the current antidumping statute, as do Australia and the
European Community ("EC").2 90 The main idea behind the clause is
to take into account negative economic consequences of antidumping
duties to consumers and consuming industries.29' However, this
clause seems to have exerted little impact in practice both in
Australia and the EC. Antidumping authorities have seldom revoked
their final dumping or injury determinations in the name of public
interest once they discovered the existence of dumping and injury.2 92
This refusal to revoke determinations may be attributed to two
factors. First, unlike antitrust authorities, antidumping authorities are
not well positioned to weigh in on the negative effects of antidumping
remedies to consumers and consuming industries, which is a critical
component of the public interest test.293 Second, those negatively
affected parties, such as consumers, often lack significant access to the
investigatory process: they often have no legal standing in the
process.294 In addition, introducing the public interest clause into the
current U.S. antidumping statute appears politically infeasible
considering the protectionist bias in Congress, which has reinforced,
through a series of amendments, the antidumping statutes and
regulations.295 Even if such a clause is established, its practical value
288. Trade Act of 1974 § 421, 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(2006) (allowing action by the
executive if foreign imports invade the market in such increased quantities as to be a
substantial cause of serious injury).
289. Claude Barfield, Antidumping: Time to Go Back to Basics, 18 WORLD ECON.
719, 732 (2005).
290. Broude labeled this camp as "reformists." Broude, supra note 284, at 311.
291. Barfield, supra note 289, at 729-31.
292. Hoekman & Mavroidis, Dumping, Antidumping and Antitrust, supra note 285, at
45-46.
293. Id.
294. Id. In the EC, the public interest ("community-interest") clause was reinforced in
1994 by according consumers legal standing. Id. at 46.
295. Barfield, supra note 289, at 729-31; Finger, supra note 29, at 57; see also
BIERWAGEN, supra note 25, at 157 (observing that a proposal for unilateral repeal of
antidumping legislation would be the "object of derision in the prevailing political
climate").
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may be questionable without contemplating additional procedural
arrangements to ensure its effectiveness.
In sum, repealing or revising the current antidumping statute
appears politically infeasible considering strong protectionist support
within Congress.
B. Antitrust Options: FTC's Intervention in the Antidumping
Proceeding
1. A Case for the FTC's Intervention
If the case of repealing or revising the antidumping statute is
politically or practically infeasible, one reasonable alternative may be
to check and discipline the antidumping proceeding under antitrust
rules. In particular, the FTC, with its unique constitutional stature as
a fourth branch guardian of competition, can play a vital role in
cabining anticompetitive aspects of the antidumping proceeding. As
former FTC Chairman Daniel Oliver noted, Congress certainly gave
the FTC responsibilities relating to international trade, in addition to
domestic commerce, when it created the Commission in 1914.296
As discussed above, the antidumping statute's lack of
consideration for consumer welfare illustrates its anticompetitive
nature. Captured by domestic producers' protectionist aspirations,
the antidumping statute disregards consumers' injuries (high prices)
while sympathizing with injuries to domestic industries. High
domestic prices are the consequence of exclusion and/or de facto price
fixing, which are the gestalt of the antidumping remedy. A mere
threat of an antidumping suit by big domestic producers is enough to
chill small foreign producers and force them to raise export 
prices. 297
In the end, antidumping duties imposed by the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection office on imports are often transferred to
consumers in the form of increased retail prices.
Unfortunately, however, the three traditional branches of the
U.S. government seem to have been largely ineffective in tackling the
anticompetitive effects of the antidumping statute, mainly because
296. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Federal Trade Commission's Role in
International Trade is to Protect Consumers Through Competition, FTC Chairman Oliver
Says (Oct. 16,1986) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
297. Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Internationalizing Our Views Toward Recoupment and
Market Power: Attacking the Antidumping/Antitrust Dichotomy Through WTO-Consistent
Global Welfare Theory, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 69, 79 (1996); A. Paul Victor,
Antidumping and Antitrust: Can the Inconsistencies Be Resolved?, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 339, 346 (1983).
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these branches themselves are involved in preserving the antidumping
regime. Ever since it passed the statute, Congress has reinforced the
protectionist nature of the antidumping statute through a series of
amendments,29 s  while the executive branch (the DOC) has
implemented the statute in a way that represents the interests of
domestic producers.299 Furthermore, the role of the judiciary in
sustaining legal cartels has been most conspicuous. Courts protect
antidumping petitions and remedies by according a broad amount of
deference over issues of fact and law to antidumping authorities, such
as the DOC and the ITC, under the Chevron doctrine.30 It seems
nearly paradoxical that the courts give a free hand to those agencies,
which are in fact vulnerable to capture by special interest groups.310'
For example, the DOC's calculations and determinations of dumping
margins are highly motivated by the inputs of domestic industries that
the DOC exists to serve. Under these circumstances, it is not
surprising that the DOC tends to find dumping margins in most
cases.
302
Even if the ITC were to come up with certain innovative
procompetitive interpretations of the law, the courts are unlikely to
subscribe to them, because they have no option but to follow the
protectionist legislative intent of antidumping statutes. For example,
298. LINDSEY & IKENSON, supra note 85, at 21.
299. Id.
300. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984). Thanks to the profuse discretion enjoyed by antidumping agencies such as the
DOC, not a single antidumping dispute has been adjudicated in the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (upholding the
DOC's controversial methodology of "zeroing" in its dumping margin calculation), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 976 (2004); Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States, 298 F.3d
1330, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (refusing to second-guess the DOC's use of best-
information-available methodology), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1031 (2003); Allied-Signal
Aerospace Co. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1188, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (viewing that the
DOC's certain calculation methodology is not a change of course mandating an agency
explanation under the Administrative Procedure Act), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1077 (1995);
Daewoo Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Int'l Union of Elec. Elec., Tech., Salaried, and Mach. Workers,
6 F.3d 1511, 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that the DOC's long-standing practice in the
calculation of U.S. price (ex factory prices) is based on a reasonable interpretation of the
Antidumping Act), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1204 (1994); Algoma Steel Co. v. United States,
865 F.2d 240, 243 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (upholding the ITC's injury determination even if it is
inconsistent with GATT), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919 (1989); Smith-Corona Group v.
United States, 713 F.2d 1568, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (acknowledging huge discretion of
the DOC in administering antidumping investigations), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984).
301. See John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 713, 724-26 (1986).
302. INJURY STATISTICS, supra note 237, at 3 (stating that, from 1980 to 2005, eighty-
two percent of cases resulted in affirmative preliminary determinations by the ITC).
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in Certain Red Raspberries from Canada,3 3 one commissioner
proposed limiting the injury determinations to predatory pricing type
dumping cases, such as below-cost foreign sales.3" This proposal
featured a five-factor test that focused on the "intent and cost
structure" of foreign producers to evaluate the degree of their
anticompetitive behaviors in the domestic market.3 5 However, in
USX Corp. v. United States,"6 the court rejected this narrow
interpretation, because this approach was inconsistent with the
antidumping statute, which permits a broader range of dumping.
307
After all, courts should conduct the injury test from the standpoint of
U.S. producers.3"8
To face the protectionist biases in the three branches, one must
contemplate an innovative response beyond conventional
institutional parameters. It is at this juncture that the distinctive
function of the FTC should be spotlighted. As the titular fourth
branch, the FTC should counteract the three branches' troubling
trade-restraining practices, which disfavor consumers and
competition itself.3" 9 In particular, the very existence of these "public
restraints" and their "long-lasting public harms," which are created
and maintained by legal cartels under the antidumping regime, not
only justifies the FTC's intervention in the antidumping matter as a
guardian of market competition, but also requires it.
310 It is well
known that the public restraints imposed by a legal cartel tend to be
more fatal to competition than private cartels, as they block a
competitor's new entry into the market more effectively.
311
Admittedly, the FTC's intervention in the antidumping
proceeding may appear to be ineffective at first blush. For example,
the FTC alone could not invalidate the whole antidumping regime
despite its anticompetitive attributes, so long as a cartel remains legal.
Nonetheless, the FTC can still expose the trade-restraining nature in
procedural aspects of the antidumping regime and limit abuses by
domestic producers in a way that minimizes potential harms to the
303. USITC Pub. 1707, Inv. No. 731-TA-196 (June 1985) (final decision).
304. Id.; Wood, supra note 107, at 1162.
305. Wood, supra note 107, at 1162-63.
306. 682 F. Supp. 60 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
307. Id. at 66-67.
308. Id. at 68.
309. Pierce, supra note 2, at 743.
310. Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Policy, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 165, 170, 173 (2005).
311. Id. at 170.
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market competition.312 One might also speculate that the FTC's pro-
competition decision would eventually be struck down by the pro-
antidumping courts. Yet, courts, on the basis of the Chevron
doctrine, should defer antitrust determinations to the FTC, as much
as they defer antidumping determinations to the DOC and the ITC.
Therefore, the FTC's professional intervention, even if it is
challenged in court later, could add another layer of regulatory
consideration for the court to take into account in the antidumping
litigation.
2. Modalities of FTC Intervention
a. Administrative Adjudication
The FTC can initiate an administrative proceeding against
domestic companies or associations if it has "reason to believe" that
those entities, through antidumping procedures, engage in unfair or
deceptive practices affecting commerce, and if it views such
administrative adjudication as serving the public interest. Although
the Commission cannot review each and every antidumping case, it
should commence a proceeding if it reasonably suspects that certain
unfair practices involved in antidumping litigation would fall within
the rubric of exclusionary behaviors under section 1 (the restraint of
trade) or section 2 (monopolization) of the Sherman Act.313
Several occasions may satisfy this threshold test and function as
triggers, initiating the Commission's adjudication over certain
antidumping petitions. If the foreign producer respondents to an
antidumping action argue that the domestic producer petitioners
deliberately manipulated or misrepresented facts and data to prevail
in the antidumping proceeding, the Commission may take a close
look at such allegations to decide whether there is any suspicion or
reason to believe that unfair practices have been conducted on the
side of domestic industries. Here, the Commission need not rely
necessarily on hard and direct evidence of bad faith in the petitioners;
312. See Patrick A. Messerlin, Should Antidumping Rules Be Replaced by National or
International Competition Rules?, 49 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFr 351, 368 (1994) (noting that
competition authorities can effectively divulge the real faces of the fair trade argument,
since they have no vested interests in antidumping remedies).
313. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."); 15 U.S.C. § 2 ("Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.").
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even certain "circumstantial evidence" may be adequate to justify
initiation of an antitrust investigation.314
Second, if either the DOC or the ITC in their preliminary
determination rules that no dumping or injury has occurred, these
negative findings may provide the FIC with grounds for suspicion
that domestic producers have engaged in anticompetitive behavior.
Although the FTC should conduct a preliminary investigation on its
own before it concludes that an aborted antidumping petition
involves certain wrongdoing and thus justifies an independent
administrative adjudication, negative determinations by the DOC or
the ITC might at least serve as a medium for such a preliminary
investigation by the FTC.315
Third, the FTC may want to probe withdrawn antidumping
petitions as a result of settlement deals between petitioners and
respondents. Economists often point out that these deals are a
product of a cartelizing collusion between domestic and international
producers, and that they effectively fix domestic prices.
316 This
practice of withdrawal after private deals has a certain demonstrative
effect on other foreign producers and effectively conveys a price-
raising signal to other respondents in similar antidumping
proceedings or to potential exporters.
317 Therefore, these de facto
price-fixing deals in the form of private price undertaking tend to give
the FTC reason to believe that certain anticompetitive conduct may
be involved.31 In constructing these reasons, the FTC should take
into account any trade-restraining consequences that the
aforementioned private settlements may cause, even though these
314. Calvani & Tritell, supra note 253, at 539.
315. de Ravel d'Esclapon, supra note 16, at 551 (observing that an antitrust action for
baseless petitions would have the greatest chances when an antidumping petition is
dismissed before being commenced either in the DOC or in the ITC).
316. Rebecca Kanter, United States v. Nippon Paper Industries: Price-Fixing
Conspiracy or Trade Remedy?, 8 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 165, 173 (2003)
(relating an interesting case in which the FTC found grounds of intent to price-fix when a
Japanese company attempted to negotiate with an antidumping petitioner).
317. See Donald S. Clark, Price-Fixing Without Collusion: An Antitrust Analysis of
Facilitating Practices after Ethyl Corp., 1983 WiS. L. REV. 887, 889 (1983) (citing the FTC's
1983 decision implying that certain "facilitating practices," even without an explicit
agreement among producers, may constitute a violation of the Sherman Act).
318. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). The Department of Justice did successfully prosecute such a
private agreement to raise domestic prices under the Sherman Act in a similar case
involving quotas. United States v. Nat'l Bd. of Fur Farms Orgs., 395 F. Supp. 56, 57 (E.D.
Wis. 1975) (concerning a price-fixing agreement between domestic mink farmers and
foreign producers in exchange for the former's discontinuation of lobbying the Congress
for quota legislation); Sims & Scott, supra note 198, at 597-99; see also, Taylor, supra note
252, at 6-7.
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settlements are technically within the parameters of the antidumping
statute and trade policies.319
If the FTC's preliminary investigation raises a prima facie case of
anticompetitive behavior by antidumping petitioners, it should issue
and serve a complaint explaining the charges and including a notice of
a hearing.32 ° If the Commission is not convinced by the antidumping
petitioner's defense at the hearing, it may require withdrawal of the
petition or cancel exclusionary or de facto price-fixing deals through a
cease and desist order.32'
b. Amicus Briefs
The FTC may offer its antitrust expertise to the ITC by
submitting amicus briefs and assisting the ITC in its injury
determination.322 The FTC retains vast ability for collecting economic
data about U.S. industries and their market performance.323 The ITC
can take into account various market- and industry-related
information provided by the FTC when deciding whether the
petitioner's alleged injuries from foreign dumping are justifiable. As
Diane Wood insightfully observed, the ITC, after reviewing data such
as the number of domestic firms and sales figures, may conclude that
the petitioner's alleged injuries either result from more efficient
foreign producers or from a desire to maintain economic rents
flowing from its monopolistic or oligopolistic position in a non-
contestable domestic market.324 Under these circumstances, the ITC
should decline to find injuries for domestic industries, because doing
so tends to maintain or solidify an anticompetitive market situation.2
In fact, one can find a premonition of this approach in the ITC's
past practices. The ITC has often refused to find injuries when
petitioners are found to be involved in anti-competitive behaviors,
such as price fixing. For example, in the early 1990s, when the
ferrosilicon price-fixing cartels were exposed and their members
prosecuted, the ITC revoked its previous injury determination
319. Sims & Scott, supra note 198, at 587.
320. Id. at 566.
321. Id. at 567
322. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Comments to ITC on Semiconductor
Dumping (Apr. 28, 1986) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
323. Wood, supra note 107, at 1193.
324. Id. at 1182-92.
325. Finger, supra note 29, at 71 (submitting that the injury investigation should be
replaced by a national economic interest investigation, which can take into account
consumers' welfare and other competition-related consequences of antidumping
measures).
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prompted by these industries' use of antidumping petitions to harass
foreign competitors.3 26 Therefore, if the ITC's position is to deny an
antidumping shelter to domestic industries that desire to create or
maintain their anticompetitive position, it can do so by actively
scanning antidumping petitions through the antitrust lens that the
FIC provides in its amicus brief. The FTC is capable of assisting the
ITC in this competition-based scanning by means of its expertise in
the market/competition analysis. The FTC's involvement in the ITC's
injury determination can be a powerful tool to prevent antidumping
remedies from unduly overprotecting domestic industries and thus
unnecessarily impeding competition.327
c. Litigation
The FTC can also make use of the federal courts in remedying
antitrust violations that domestic industries engaging in antidumping
actions may commit. The FTC has litigation authority in antitrust
cases concurrently with the Attorney General,328  but can
independently represent itself in cases where the Attorney General
declines to act.329 Moreover, the FTC is exclusively authorized to
represent itself "in its own name by any of its attorneys" before the
federal court under certain circumstances,330 such as when it seeks
injunctive relief under section 13 of the FTC Act331 or consumer
redress under section 19 of the FTC Act.332 Therefore, the FTC can
sue domestic producers before a federal court under the Sherman Act
when producers commit certain egregious anticompetitive behaviors,
such as conspiring to monopolize the domestic market or exercising
other kinds of exclusion through various non-price predation tactics,
326. Pierce, supra note 2, at 726-28.
327. For example, in the 64K/256K DRAMs case, the FTC argued before the ITC that
the price of Japanese DRAMs had declined not because of dumping, but because of
Japan's comparative advantage in producing them. See 64K Dynamic Random Access
Memory Components from Japan, USITC Pub. 1862, Inv. No. 731-TA-270 (June 1988)
(final decision); Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of 256 Kilobits and
Above From Japan, USITC. Pub. 1803, Inv. No. 731-TA-300, at 24 (Jan. 1986) (prelim.
determination). Yet, the FTC's intervention was not always well received by the
Commissioners. See Harvey M. Applebaum & David R. Grace, U.S. Antitrust Law and
Antidumping Actions Under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 56 ANTITRUST
L.J. 497, 516-17 (1987).
328. 15 U.S.C. § 56(a)(1)(A) (2006).
329. 15 U.S.C. § 56(a)(1)(B).
330. 15 U.S.C. § 56(a)(2).
331. 15 U.S.C. § 53.
332. 15 U.S.C. § 57b.
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including deliberate misrepresentations in the antidumping
proceeding.
As a guardian of public interest, the FTC should seek
"preliminary or permanent injunctive relief" against certain
government actions related to antidumping remedies when the
proceedings are initiated by domestic producers to achieve
anticompetitive goals.333  For example, if domestic producers
deliberately provide manipulated facts to the DOC, and the DOC
makes a preliminary dumping determination and subsequently
imposes bonds for future antidumping duties on the basis of such
facts, the FTC may obtain preliminary injunctive relief against such a
bond requirement to prevent any injury to consumers.
C. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: A Formidable Obstacle to
Antitrust Disciplines
1. The Noerr-Pennington Exemption: Its Jurisprudence and
Rationale
As discussed above, antidumping remedies are intended to
protect domestic industries from foreign competition, and they
naturally involve a restraint on trade through severe interference with
prices and output of foreign rivals.334 These aspects directly concern
the very rationale of antitrust statutes, such as the Sherman Act.3
Therefore, the FTC's antitrust scrutiny can tame antidumping
remedies.336 Unfortunately, however, a judicially crafted antitrust
exemption, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, restricts the applicability
of antitrust statutes to antidumping remedies.
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which developed through two
similar Supreme Court decisions (Noerr and Pennington) in the 1960s,
gives antitrust immunity to domestic producers who cooperate and
exchange information among themselves in order to file antidumping
suits against foreign producers.337 As a brainchild of the Warren
333. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
334. See supra Part I.
335. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal." (emphasis added)).
336. See Calvani & Tritell, supra note 253, at 528-29 (observing that various officials
from antitrust authorities, i.e., the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission, have raised the question of disciplining anticompetitive aspects of
antidumping proceedings or determinations).
337. Gary Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and Antitrust: A Modern
Reassessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 905, 926-27 (1990).
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Court, the Noerr decision predicated its rationale on the political
freedom reified in the Bill of Rights-in particular, the freedom of
expression under the First Amendment. In Noerr, railroad industries
lobbied and petitioned Congress to pass antitruck legislation amid
intense competition with truckers.338 Justice Black held that the
Sherman Act should not be employed to bar those railroad industries
from exercising their political rights of lobbying and petitioning to
pursue their interests.339
In Pennington, the Supreme Court further expanded the
doctrinal reach of Noerr.34 ° First, the Pennington Court extended the
Noerr immunity to lobbies directed to the Executive branch, while
the Noerr decision concerned lobbies to Congress. Second, Justice
White, writing for the majority, further ruled that the union's effort to
lobby and petition the Secretary of Labor should be given antitrust
immunity even if its intention was to eliminate competition.341
Therefore, the Court immunized the miners' union from antitrust
scrutiny over its role in creating an agreement that eventually led to a
cartelization of coal industries in exchange for increased wages to
union members.342
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is premised on a staunch belief in
the political freedom embedded in the First Amendment. The
doctrine, finding its theoretical underpinnings in political pluralism
and the "marketplace of ideas," takes an optimistic view of political
competition among various interest groups that it believes will lead to
a rational outcome, as "invisible hands" determine right prices in the
market.3 43  Therefore, in order for this political market to operate
well, the autonomy of those interest groups should be preserved, and
their privilege to pursue self-interests fully guaranteed, without
restraints imposed by the government." In this very context, Justice
338. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. E. R.R. Presidents Conf., 155 F. Supp. 768, 775-78
(E.D.Pa. 1957).
339. E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961).
340. Minda, supra note 337, at 927.
341. Id.
342. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657,670 (1965).
343. Minda, supra note 337, at 938-42.
344. See id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539, 1542 (1988) ("[P]olitics consists of a struggle among interest groups for scarce social
resources. ... [T]hey exert pressure on political representatives, who respond, in a
market-like manner, to the pressures thus exerted. The ultimate result is political
equilibrium."); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 33-34 (1985) ("Political ordering is, in this view, assimilated to market ordering.
... This market-like mechanism would promote aggregate social welfare through an
'invisible hand' like that found in other markets.").
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Black's opinion in Noerr feared that an application of antitrust law
under the Sherman Act would "disqualify people from taking a public
position on matters in which they are financially interested" and
would thus "deprive the people of their right to petition in the very
instances in which that right may be of the most importance to
them."345
However, this sanguine perspective on interest group politics has
been heavily criticized by pluralists, who have raised various
empirical protests. For example, Robert Dahl, qua a pluralist himself,
admitted the so-called "dilemmas of the pluralist Democracy," in
which powerful interest groups may "stabiliz[e] inequalities, deform[ ]
civic consciousness, [and] distort[ ] the public agenda." '346 Dahl
warned against an anachronistically na've proposition to which
classical pluralism clings. Modern private actors are no longer
atomistic players defined and controlled by mechanisms of the
political marketplace. With more power and efficient organization,
private actors are now capable of controlling and manipulating the
political marketplace to their own benefit.347 Therefore, Dahl's
insightful observation is correct; without a radical restructuring of the
borders of the private and public spheres of the government, the
democratic aspiration of "egalitarian pluralism" cannot be fulfilled.348
2. A Broad Antitrust Immunity for Antidumping Petitioners: The
Sham Exception and Its Drawbacks
As discussed above, the political liberalism that served as the
rationale for the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is prone to criticism.
Forebodings over the doctrine's broad exemption led the Supreme
Court to declare that the doctrine would not be unqualified. Justice
Black himself came up with an exception to the doctrine in Noerr,
labeled the "sham exception. 3 49  Under the sham exception, a
domestic industry's lobbying or petition is a "mere sham [when used]
to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor.""35
345. E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139-40
(1988).
346. Minda, supra note 337, at 943 (quoting ROBERT DAHL, DILEMMAS OF
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY V. CONTROL 166 (1982)).
347. Minda, supra note 337, at 944.
348. Id.; see DAHL, supra note 346, at 166-205 (1982) (discussing possible reforms to
correct the growing influence and power of private interests).
349. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
350. Id.
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Critically, however, the sham exception has largely been
fossilized without much use on account of the Court's extremely
narrow interpretation in subsequent cases. For example, the
Pennington Court refused to apply the sham exception even to those
situations in which parties explicitly revealed an antitrust intention-
to eliminate competition. Justice White wrote that "[j]oint efforts to
influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though
intended to eliminate competition," so long as "[s]uch conduct is not
illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself
violative of the Sherman Act." '351
The subsequent Supreme Court decisions further consolidated
antitrust immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine by
narrowing the operational scope of the sham exception. In
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industry,
Inc. ("PRE"), the Court outlined a two-pronged definition of sham
litigation.35 First, the complaint should be "objectively baseless" in
the sense that no reasonable litigant would expect success on the
merits.353 Second, if the first prong is met, the Court will then address
the subjective motivation for the litigation. The question is whether
the litigant has attempted to directly interfere with the business
relationship of a competitor through the use of government process
itself, regardless of its outcome. 4 The upshot is that the existence of
any "probable cause" to institute legal proceedings precludes the
sham exception.355
Under the sham test, as watered down by the PRE decision, it
appears practically impossible to subject any antidumping petitions
launched by domestic producers to an antitrust scrutiny, despite their
oligopolistic intention and the exclusionary effects of their petitions.
For example, even inaccurate petitions rife with "deliberate
misstatements" might not be objectively baseless356 if such petitions
eventually prevail, because "a winning lawsuit is by definition a
351. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
352. Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49,
60-61 (1993).
353. Id. at 60.
354. Id. at 60-61 (observing that the inquiry "should focus on whether the baseless
lawsuit conceals an 'attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor' through the 'use of governmental process-as opposed to the outcome of that
process-as an anticompetitive weapon' ") (emphasis in original) (internal citations
omitted).
355. Profl Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 62.
356. Music Ctr. S.N.C. Di Luciano Pisoni & C. v. Prestini Musical Instruments Corp.,
874 F. Supp. 543, 549 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
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reasonable effort at petitioning for redress and therefore not a
sham. 357 Even a malicious antidumping suit, which is "intended
solely to injure plaintiffs competitively in a trade war that defendants
appear to be losing, and not to secure the trade relief for which such
petitions were created by Congress," would escape antitrust scrutiny
if the petitioner could reasonably expect to win the case.358 Moreover,
if a government's determination is not influenced by the
misrepresentations, such misrepresentations are not regarded as
"material" and thus do not bar the application of the Noerr-
Pennington exception.35 9
The PRE case and subsequent lower court jurisprudence on the
sham exception are overly lax and thus highly troubling. This result-
oriented jurisprudence on the sham test tends to overprotect
antidumping petitioners at the enormous expense of market
competition. Under this jurisprudence, even severe
misrepresentations, such as frauds, may be sheltered from antitrust
scrutiny. This jurisprudence is a recipe for procedural abuse or
irregularities. First of all, every petitioner who engages in
misrepresentation entertains some expectation that he or she will win
the case. Accordingly, every misrepresentation may be a reasonable
effort toward trade remedies and therefore not a sham. Moreover, a
judge may not be able to distinguish "material" misrepresentations
from immaterial ones. In other words, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to establish causation between a certain
misrepresentation and a favorable government action. All in all,
misrepresentations made in antidumping proceedings are, in most
cases, likely to pass the sham test in PRE.
Moreover, this pro-petitioner bias in antidumping proceeding
tends to increase the potential merits of a complaint and bolster the
case for antitrust immunity. Antidumping authorities' generous
stance toward imprecise information provided by petitioners boosts
the petitioning party's chances to win the proceeding, especially when
the DOC may rely on such information as "facts available."36 These
elevated chances of winning tend to clear the petitioner from the
objective baselessness test under the sham exception. Even if the ITC
357. Profl Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60 n.5; see also Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v.
Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1999) (ruling that antidumping petitions involving
alleged misrepresentation are still under the protection of the Noerr-Pennington
immunity).
358. See Music Ctr., 874 F. Supp. at 554-55.
359. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d at 124.
360. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (2006).
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finds no injury to the petitioner, and, thus, the original petition can no
longer stand on the merits, the petition may still not be objectively
baseless if the DOC finds some dumping margins.361 Under these
circumstances, in which all the government agencies or branches
involved in antidumping proceedings, such as the DOC, the ITC, and
the Court of International Trade, unabashedly favor the petitioners, a
reasonable petitioner would not in fact expect that it would ever lose.
In sum, this blanket antitrust immunity under the broadest
construction of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and the narrowest
interpretation of the sham exception results from the Warren Court's
internalization of a naYvely optimistic, and thus flawed, understanding
of interest group politics.3 62 This misunderstanding tends to sanction
spurious filings of antidumping petitions whose sole purpose is to
harass competitive foreign rivals by blocking their access to the
domestic market. Moreover, this overreaching antitrust immunity
tends to put domestic industries in a more advantageous position to
force their foreign competitors to join a price-fixing cartel under the
threat of antidumping suits.3 63  Consequently, market competition
comes to its demise in the name of First Amendment rights.3"
IV. REVITALIZING ANTITRUST OPTIONS APPLIED TO TRADE
REMEDIES
A. An Intent-Oriented Test: Judicial Reconstruction of the Sham
Exception
The court's overly liberal interpretation of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine prohibitively hampers the FTC's potential antitrust scrutiny
over antidumping remedies. Reconstructing the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine is inextricably linked to rethinking the sham exception.
Some lower court opinions inspiringly illustrate such potential. In
Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp.,365 Judge Sloviter's dissent
criticized the majority for blindly following the PRE court's
361. See Music Ctr., 874 F. Supp. at 554.
362. See Minda, supra note 337, at 933-34.
363. In Music Center, plaintiffs (a foreign producer and an importer) argued that the
defendant (a domestic producer) filed an antidumping suit after the plaintiffs refused an
offer from the defendant to join the price-fixing cartel. 874 F.Supp. at 548.
364. But cf. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1765, 1782 (2004) ("[D]espite
the constitutionalization of commercial speech, antitrust law has proceeded unhindered-
its constraints on speech, advocacy, and the exchange of accurate information remaining
behind the First Amendment's reach.").
365. 168 F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 1999).
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"objective baselessness" test,366 highlighting the Supreme Court's
declaration in California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unltd.
3 67
Limiting the application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine over
fraudulent and unethical misrepresentations by petitioners,368 Judge
Sloviter aptly observed in her dissent that "the majority ignores the
risk that a party will intentionally use fraud and misrepresentation to
transform a claim that is otherwise weak and unlikely to prevail,
although not 'objectively baseless,' into one that succeeds.
3 69
Then, Judge Sloviter prioritized the "fraud" over "objective
baselessness" in an effort to reconstruct the sham exception, citing
some courts of appeal decisions in that direction.370 In Whelan v.
Abell,371 the Federal Circuit struck down a district court's application
of antitrust immunity on the grounds that such immunity should not
be available when petitioners present "deliberately false" material
representations, even if the litigation itself was not baseless.372
Likewise, in Kottle v. Northwest Kidney Centers,373 the Ninth Circuit
held that a litigation may be a sham if a party's "intentional
misrepresentations" to the court rid the litigation of its
"legitimacy. "
374
In a similar context, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit
potentially increased the possibilities of subjecting antidumping
petitions to antitrust scrutiny by broadening the operational scope of
the sham exception. In a likely departure from the strictures of
political expression under PRE, Judge Posner, in Grip-Pak, Inc. v.
Illinois Tool Works,376 revived the critical importance of harassing
intents of litigants in determining whether filing a lawsuit is a sham.377
Employing the common law tort of abusive process, Judge Posner
held that a litigant crossed the line and was subject to antitrust
scrutiny via the sham exception. This scrutiny applies even if the
litigant presents a probable cause or colorful claim, so long as his or
her sole purpose is not to win the case but to harass competitors
366. Id. at 131-32 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
367. 404 U.S. 508 (1971).
368. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d at 131-32 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
369. Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
370. Id.
371. 48 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
372. Id. at 1254-55.
373. 146 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 1998).
374. ld. at 1060.
375. See Minda, supra note 337, at 966-67.
376. 694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1982).
377. Id. at 470-72.
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regardless of the outcome of the case.378 In a subsequent case, Judge
Easterbrook, based on Judge Posner's analysis in Grip-Pak, held that
cost justification in a lawsuit should determine sham liability.
379 If a
litigant's litigation cost is well beyond a prospective benefit from the
merits of the case, no rational person would engage in such litigation
because there is no cost justification. The only foreseeable benefit
would be from an upsurge of litigation costs to a rival to the extent
that the current market price is sustained." If such a foreseeable
benefit exists, such cases would fall under the rubric of sham
litigation.
The Grip-Pak case law tends to furnish courts with critical
avenues that catalyze antitrust scrutiny of possible anticompetitive
behaviors by antidumping petitioners. More often than not, a
powerful association of domestic producers files antidumping suits
against small foreign producers in an attempt to thwart their entries
into the U.S. market.38' In this adversarial proceeding, foreign
respondents, who are often small companies, are highly
disadvantaged vis-A-vis big domestic petitioners armed with big law
firms and accountants.382 As stated before, the mere filing of an
antidumping petition, regardless of its merit, can financially burden
foreign producers and be an effective harassment technique.383 The
antidumping authorities' heavy reliance on petitioners for facts and
data further disadvantages respondents.384 Therefore, one can easily
locate a petitioner's intent to harass when he or she deliberately
exaggerates or manipulates price and output data in his or her
antidumping petitions.
Considering the foregoing predatory nature of antidumping
procedures, the Supreme Court should rationalize an operational
scope for the Noerr-Pennington doctrine through a more proactive
use of the sham exception, in line with the Grip-Pak decision. One
possible way of doing so is to introduce a presumption of the
existence of a "sham" whenever a deliberate misrepresentation is
detected. A deliberate misrepresentation in an antidumping
proceeding is a grave non-price predation, which should raise a red
flag despite the First Amendment consideration. Thus, those
378. Id.
379. Minda, supra note 337, at 968-69.
380. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358, 372
(7th Cir. 1987).
381. See supra Part I.B.
382. See MARSHALL, supra note 226, at 178-79.
383. Id. at 175-76.
384. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (2006).
2009]
HeinOnline -- 87 N.C. L. Rev. 415 2008-2009
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
petitioners who deliberately misrepresent critical facts in order to
prevail in an antidumping proceeding should be deprived of antitrust
immunity, at least provisionally. Unless petitioners can rebut the
presumption-for example, by proving that their misrepresentations
have not been material-they should be subject to antitrust scrutiny.
This way, the court can restore the balance between political freedom
and market competition, which has been skewed toward the former
under the hitherto operation of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
In sum, where a deliberate misrepresentation or fraud is
perpetrated on antidumping authorities for predatory purposes, the
courts should presumptively find the petition to be "objectively
baseless" and thus constituting a "sham." Unless domestic petitioners
can rebut the presumption, they should be stripped of Noerr-
Pennington immunity and subject to antitrust scrutiny over their
alleged predatory behavior under the Sherman Act.
B. FTC's Effective Surveillance over the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
1. FTC Enforcement and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
As discussed above, the FTC, as an enforcer of the Sherman Act,
bears the principal responsibility for monitoring whether sham
litigation is launched in violation of the Sherman Act, thus using the
antidumping mechanism as a sheer instrumentality of restricting
market competition. In its recent In the Matter of Union Oil Co. of
California ("Unocal") decision, the Commission emphasized that
[w]hether we view misrepresentation as a distinct variant of
sham petitioning or as a separate exception to Noerr-
Pennington, the fabric of existing law is rich enough to extend
antitrust coverage, in appropriate circumstances, to
anticompetitive conduct flowing from deliberate
misrepresentations that undermine the legitimacy of
government proceedings.385
The mere commencement of an antitrust investigation should not
be translated automatically into an affirmative determination of
antitrust liability. The FTC will still be subject to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, and the Commission's findings are judicially
reviewable. Nonetheless, the FTC's active review of antidumping
proceedings would convey a powerful warning to domestic producers
385. In the matter of Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305, slip op. at 30 (Fed. Trade
Comm'n. Jul. 7, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/040706commission
opinion.pdf [hereinafter "Unocal"].
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who might be tempted to abuse the antidumping remedies and thus
would deter, to a considerable extent, spurious or harassing petitions
based on manipulated or false information. This kind of FTC
oversight could help to remedy the current situation, in which nearly
half of all antidumping petitions turn out to be without merit (no
dumping margins).386
First, if the width and depth of cooperation among domestic
industries in the petition stage goes beyond what is deemed necessary
to launch an antidumping complaint, such conduct may not be
protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Consequently, the FTC
would subject such action to antitrust scrutiny doctrine and thus
subject to antitrust scrutiny by the FTC. The FTC, along with the
Department of Justice, states that:
[W]ere the parties directly to exchange extensive information
relating to their costs, the prices each has charged for the
product, pricing trends, and profitability, including information
about specific transactions that went beyond the scope of those
facts required for the adjudication, such conduct would go
beyond the contemplated protection of Noerr immunity.
387
Second, the FTC should actively employ the new doctrinal test,
introduced in the recent Unocal decision, for deliberate
misrepresentation.388 In Unocal, the Commission spelled out a two-
tiered test in which a petition with misrepresentations would lose the
Noerr-Pennington protection in nonpolitical contexts such as an
antidumping proceeding: first, the misrepresentation or omission
must be "deliberate, factually verifiable, and central to the outcome
of the proceeding or case"; and second, "it [must be] possible to
demonstrate and remedy this effect without undermining the integrity
386. See Gunn, supra note 17, at 177.
387. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
GUIDELINES FOR INT'L OPERATIONS 28 ex.L (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/guidelines/internat.htm; see also William T. Lifland, Monopolies and Joint
Ventures, in 1 34TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE 448 app. B (1993) (observing
that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine would not shield the exchange of information among
antidumping petitioners designed to implement a "naked" price-fixing agreement). But cf.
United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (holding that "agreement
between the relatively few dominant sellers of corrugated containers, a fungible product
for which demand was inelastic, to give to each other on request information as to most
recent price charged or quoted, resulting in stabilization of prices, violated Sherman
Act").
388. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 201, at 37-38 (addressing "deliberate and
material misrepresentations that deprive governmental proceedings of their legitimacy in
other nonpolitical contexts").
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of the deceived governmental entity." '389 The Unocal test is consistent
with a number of lower court decisions rejecting the application of
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine with regard to cases involving
deliberate misrepresentations.39 ° Therefore, the Unocal test could
provide effective regulation in the typical misrepresentation situation
in the antidumping proceeding.
Critically, the Unocal test follows a different jurisprudential path
from the PRE Court and thus is doctrinally distinguishable from the
PRE sham exception. The Unocal test derives from Allied Tube, in
which the Supreme Court explicitly distinguished a conduct that
"genuinely seeks to achieve [a] governmental result, but does so
through improper means," from a traditional meritless sham situation,
which the PRE case targeted.39' Therefore, the Unocal test can
overcome an extremely narrow scope of the sham exception, defined
by the first prong ("objective baselessness" test) in PRE because the
test concerns those misrepresentations that do seek favorable
government actions-such as affirmative dumping or injury
determinations-not just meritless (sham) petitions. As a result, the
Unocal test provides a powerful check against these "unethical and
deceptive practices," like data manipulation or other
misrepresentations by petitioners in the antidumping proceeding.392
Accordingly, the Unocal test is preferable as a means of deterring
anticompetitive behavior damaging to the economy while posing no
threats to political freedom.
Finally, the FTC should carve out an exception to the Noerr-
Pennington protection with regard to repetitively filed antidumping
petitions aimed at harassing foreign competitors regardless of the
outcome.393 Due to the lack of res judicata and collateral estoppel in
389. Unocal, No. 9305, slip op. at 48 (arguing that fraud and misrepresentation are not
protected by the First Amendment); see also FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 201, at 25
(recognizing the two-tiered test).
390. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 201, at 25-26.
391. Allied Tub & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 507 n.10 (1988)
(citing Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., Inc., 827 F.2d 458, 465 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987));
see also F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 425 (1990) (refusing to
apply Noerr when the restraint was "the means by which respondents sought to obtain
favorable legislation," not "the consequence of public action").
392. See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512-13 (1972)
(recognizing an antitrust cause of action against parties who employ federal and state
petitions in order to monopolize an industry); see also Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky
Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1261 (9th Cir. 1982) ("There is no first
amendment protection for furnishing with predatory intent false information to an
administrative or adjudicative body.").
393. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 201, at 38.
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antidumping proceedings, domestic producers can file new petitions
on the same subject matter, even if they fail to succeed in the first
round.394 The PRE test would not apply to repetitive antidumping
petitions, because that case involved a single petition.
3 95 Even though
some individual filings in the repetitive continuum may be successful,
thus passing the sham test in PRE, repetitive filing as a whole should
still be subject to antitrust scrutiny if it constitutes an essential part of
a strategy to harass competitors regardless of the merit.
396 In other
words, "a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which
leads the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and judicial
processes have been abused."397
2. The FTC Registration of the Noerr-Pennington Exemption
In addition to the aforementioned ex post monitoring, the
Commission can also employ a more preemptive, ex ante monitoring
scheme. Under its administrative rulemaking authority, the FTC may
require domestic industries to register with the Commission before
they can benefit from the Noerr-Pennington exemption in jointly
launching antidumping petitions against foreign producers.
3 98 This
requirement serves two main purposes. First, it puts the Commission
in a better position to monitor possible anticompetitive behaviors that
may fall within the rubric of "sham" litigation. It is crucial for the
Commission to get information as to which companies or associations
file antidumping petitions, because it can detect oligopolistic behavior
or cartelizing more effectively than the courts. Second, such a
requirement tends to exert psychological pressure under the shadow
of the Commission's potential Sherman Act investigation of
antidumping complainants and thus deters abusive behavior, such as
deliberate misrepresentation of facts.
394. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(a), 1673a(a) (2006); Josephs, supra note 189, at 66
("[B]ecause the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply in
antidumping proceedings, unsuccessful petitioners may bring repeated actions until
success is finally achieved.").
395. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 201, at 33.
396. Id. at 31.
397. Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513; see also USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa
County Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, AFL-CIO, 31 F.3d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 1994)
(inquiring whether legal filings were made "not out of a genuine interest in redressing
grievances, but as a part of a pattern or practice of successive filings undertaken essentially
for purposes of harassment").
398. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d) (stipulating that the FTC may "prescribe such other rules
as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section"); 15 U.S.C.
§ 46(g) (providing that the FTC may "make rules and regulations for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions of this subchapter").
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This rulemaking proposal is not unprecedented; it has already
been adopted and implemented in a parallel area. The Webb-
Pomerene Act399 provides a case in point. The Act, legislated in 1918,
permits U.S. exporters to collude among themselves in foreign
markets under the exemption of the Sherman Act.4" It purports to
prevent U.S. small and medium exporters from being disadvantaged
in foreign markets by their own domestic law vis-A-vis foreign rivals
who were seldom subject to rigorous antitrust discipline.401
Nonetheless, the Webb-Pomerene Act does not tolerate any antitrust
consequences within the United States. For example, if those
exporters attempt to "artificially or intentionally enhance[ ] or
depress[ ]" U.S. prices on similar products that they trade, or they
attempt to "substantially lessen[ ] competition" within the United
States, such behaviors are not immune from the Sherman Act.4 2
Highlighting these exceptions, the FTC, by promulgating its own
rules, reiterated a limited antitrust exemption under the Webb-
Pomerene Act and declared potential antitrust jurisdiction in those
situations falling under the exceptions.4 3
The FTC's rule-making experience under the Webb-Pomerene
Act sheds light on its similar responsibilities over the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. Both the Webb-Pomerene Act and the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine concern antitrust immunity rendered to protect
U.S. industries from foreign competition arising under international
trade. Yet, antitrust immunity under both situations is not unlimited
and is conditioned by certain exceptions. Therefore, the FTC, as it
does under the Webb-Pomerene Act, should set an internal rule by
which to check and monitor whether these exemptions to antitrust
exception are triggered by domestic industries' possible abusive use
of antidumping petitions. Under the proposed registration or
notification rule, the Commission, while still accommodating the
Noerr-Pennington exemption, can extend its potential jurisdiction to
any abusive antitrust behaviors, such as sham petitions, which cannot
be protected even under the exemption.4 "4 If the Commission has
399. Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66.
400. Id.
401. See Elaine Metlin et al., The Webb-Pomerene Act: A Relic That Has Outlived Its




402. 15 U.S.C. § 62.
403. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.41-1.43 (2008).
404. See id. §§ 1.41, 1.42.
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''reason to believe" that those abusive behaviors occur in violation of
the Sherman Act, it may initiate an investigation.
°5  If the
Commission concludes after the investigation that the Act has been
violated, it may recommend that domestic companies or associations
withdraw their antidumping petitions.4 6
Concededly, one might object to this registration proposal by
arguing that it goes beyond the FTC's statutory mandate and violates
the First Amendment rights embedded in the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. Truly, the Webb-Pomerene Act cannot serve as a First
Amendment defense. Critically, however, the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, even as it stands now, only limits, not fully eradicates, the
application of antitrust disciplines. The registration scheme proposed
here would screen out certain egregious, fraudulent abuses of the
doctrine without running afoul of the First Amendment principle.
After all, these unethical and fraudulent behaviors do not further any
values protected by the First Amendment, and "the First Amendment
has not been interpreted to preclude liability for false statements.
40 7
C. Disapplying the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine Based on Tort Law
In an attempt to narrow the scope of antitrust immunity, Gary
Minda linked common law remedies (e.g., the tort of abusive
litigation) to antitrust challenges against predatory behaviors or other
anticompetitive actions to restrain trade.4
8 First, he finds a possibility
of disapplying the Noerr-Pennington doctrine under certain
circumstances in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery
& Chemical Corp.,4"9 which justified the introduction of common law
remedies in the area of antitrust disciplines.
410 In Walker Process, the
Supreme Court held that the enforcement of a patent earned by fraud
in order to monopolize or attempt to monopolize a relevant market
may violate section 2 of the Sherman Act.
4 ' By focusing on the
fraudulent behaviors and anticompetitive motivations of the
petitioner, the Court paved the way for disciplining abusive
405. Id. § 1.43.
406. Id.
407. Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240,
1261 (9th Cir. 1982); see also In the Matter of Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305, slip op. at
17-19 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Jul. 7, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/
d9305/040706commissionopinion.pdf (arguing that knowing misrepresentations are not
protected by the First Amendment).
408. Minda, supra note 337, at 1022-23.
409. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
410. See Minda, supra note 337, at 1023.
411. See Walker Process Equip., Inc., 382 U.S. at 175-76.
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petitioning without engaging the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.412 When
applied to antidumping complaints, the Walker Process case law can
be adopted by courts, at least by analogy, to subject domestic
industries' predatory antidumping petitions based on deliberate
misrepresentations on facts and data to the Sherman Act disciplines,
without any need to engage the doctrine of Noerr-Pennington
immunity.
This approach of stripping antidumping petitioners of the Noerr-
Pennington privilege via tort doctrines, such as tortious interference,
hinges on the basic values that the general tort system aims to protect,
like fairness and business ethics.413 If domestic producers abuse the
import relief, such as the antidumping mechanism, through an
intentional, deliberate use of false information and misstatements,
they fail to comply with the "rules of the game," and the value of
competition is compromised beyond the permissible exception.4 4
Under these circumstances, antitrust immunity, which is reserved for
normal joint petitioning under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, is no
longer applied.
Nonetheless, it remains uncertain whether the court subscribes to
this tort-based disapplication of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. In
fact, the Third Circuit in Ethyl extended the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine even to common law tort claims. In this case, an Indian
ibuprofen manufacturer, Cheminor, sued an American ibuprofen
manufacturer, Ethyl, on the grounds of antitrust violation and
common law torts of unfair competition and tortious interference.415
Ethyl was the only bulk ibuprofen producer in the United States
before Cheminor started to export bulk ibuprofen to the United
States.416 After filing a petition with the USTR to block Cheminor's
market access, Ethyl filed an antidumping and countervailing duty
suit against Cheminor and obtained a decision ordering Cheminor to
pay 43.71% duties on their export amounts.4 17 This additional cost
412. See Minda, supra note 337, at 971 n.232.
413. Cf. Marina Lao, Tortious Interference and the Federal Antitrust Law of Vertical
Restraints, 83 IOWA L. REV. 35, 73-74 (1997) (differentiating the social fundamentals of
tort law from the economic fundamentals of antitrust law).
414. See id. Regarding tortious interference, see generally Orrin K. Ames III, Tortious
Interference with Business Relationships: The Changing Contours of the Commercial Tort,
35 CUMB. L. REV. 317 (2005), and Mark P. Gergen, Tortious Interference: How It Is
Engulfing Commercial Law, Why This Is Not Entirely Bad, and a Prudent Response, 38
ARIz. L. REV. 1175 (1996).
415. Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 120 (3d Cir. 1999).
416. Id. at 129 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
417. Id.
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forced Cheminor to retreat from the U.S. market, which was followed
by Ethyl withdrawing its petition.4"8 Cheminor then sued Ethyl on
grounds of both antitrust and common law tort.
419
The district court dismissed the antitrust claim under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine and rejected jurisdiction over the common law
torts on procedural grounds.4 20 The Third Circuit also dismissed the
antitrust claim by applying the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. At the
same time, it extended the doctrine to the tort claims and thus
rejected them.421 The court held that:
[W]e have been presented with no persuasive reason why these
state tort claims, based on the same petitioning activity as the
federal claims, would not be barred by the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine.422
The court basically viewed First Amendment principles as
applying to the New Jersey tort claims based on Brownsville, which
held that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunizes tort liability for
the failure of reporting nursing home violations to regulatory
authorities.423
However, the dissenting judge in Ethyl, Judge Sloviter, who was
the very author of the Brownsville opinion, argued that the majority's
interpretation of the sham exception was flawed and thus unduly
narrowed the operational scope of the Sherman Act.
424 She also
contended that Brownsville should not be read to warrant the
majority's broad application of antitrust immunity to common law
tort claims, because the decision simply dismissed a damage action
against a legitimate reporting activity and should thus be
distinguished from the current case, which elicited government
actions via alleged fraudulent misrepresentations.425
Therefore, one might reasonably conclude that deliberate and
fraudulent misrepresentations in antidumping proceedings could still
potentially be subject to common law tort claims and thus block the
application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 120.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 128.
423. See Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wells, 839 F.2d 155, 159-60
(3d Cir. 1988).
424. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d at 134 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
425. Id.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that antidumping remedies, while
unsupported by the unfair trade justification, serve the special
interests of certain domestic producers at the expense of consumers.
It further contends that courts should clear antitrust disciplines of
doctrinal obstructions, most notably the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
through a broader construction of the sham exception. In the same
vein, antitrust authorities, in particular the FTC, should pursue
enforcement efforts over certain abusive behaviors by antidumping
petitioners and introduce a registration scheme in line with the Webb-
Pomerene Act. Finally, the courts should decline to apply the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine to cases based on common law tort principles,
such as unfair interference with business.
While "the first amendment [sic] has not been interpreted to
preclude liability for false statements, ' 42 6 the courts have failed to
provide clear guidance as to. the scope of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. 427 This Article recognizes the FTC's statutory jurisdiction
over trade remedies and calls for a proactive stance by the FTC on
this issue. In doing so, the FTC can achieve the same goal shared by
trade and antitrust policies: "ensuring efficient functioning of
markets by the removal or control of restrictive business practices. '428
Administrative protections, such as antidumping measures, not only
impede international commerce but also cause market distortions,
which prevent growth and job creation both domestically and
internationally.429  Antitrust oversight of trade remedies will
eventually bring forth the salutary effect of forcing domestic
producers to become more innovative and competitive in the global
market.430
J. Michael Finger once portrayed the antidumping regime as a
"witches' brew of the worst of policy making: power politics, bad
economics, and shameful public administration. ' 431 Now, it is time to
break this protectionist spell by applying an antitrust potion.
426. Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240,
1261 (9th Cir. 1982).
427. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 201, at 16.
428. OECD, COMPETITION AND TRADE POLICIES: THEIR INTERACTION 11 (1984).
429. Id. at 73-74.
430. Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Competition Before the Fed. Trade
Comm'n, 103rd Cong. 1304-1526 (1995) (statement of Joseph Stiglitz, Chairman, Council
of Economic Advisors), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/GC101295.shtm.
431. Finger, supra note 29, at 57.
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